

THE SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

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President : The Right Hon. A. J. BALFOUR, M.P.

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THE SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

VOL. XIII. No. 3.

JULY, 1921.

DEMOCRACY AND CIVILIZATION.

THE question of the survival of civilization which month by month becomes more doubtful and more urgent, does not depend on political institutions alone. Fundamentally it is a question of the available amount of moral wisdom in mankind, and it is precisely the deficit in this amount that is the main ground of anxiety. When peoples that have known law and liberty give themselves over deliberately to the alternatives of violence and despotism the outlook is dark, and when the resources of science continually add to the means of destruction the lack of moral control constitutes a standing danger of ruin on an ever-increasing scale. We can look for safety to no mere improvement of political machinery. The change must be spiritual and widespread, such as a new religion might bring. Nevertheless the spiritual change must in public affairs take effect through political institutions, and the working of democratic institutions in particular does provide some measure of the sum of moral wisdom available to control the common life. The modern world has become, at least in outward form and semblance, more democratic. The war which has ruined so much has at any rate dragged down the great military autocracies in the common disaster. Hence the character of democracy, the mode of its operation, what it has performed, and what it may yet promise or make possible, are questions of even greater interest and urgency than of old. To these questions Lord Bryce's great work on "Modern Democracies" is by far the most serious attempt at a reply which is as yet available.

Lord Bryce's method is inductive. It is an extension of the plan on which his "American Commonwealth" was based. It is founded on direct personal observation, combined with careful questioning of men, and studious examination of law and history. For the combination of zeal, detail and accuracy it is a marvel, uniting, one may say, the Herodotean method of travel observation and enquiry with Thucydidean reflection and severity. In detail Lord Bryce has limited himself to six democracies—the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Switzerland, and France—omitting that which he knows best of all, England, on the self-denying ground that he has seen it too closely to judge it

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dispassionately. There are, however, constant references to democracy at all times and in all places, and there are brief but useful accounts of ancient democracy and of the South American Republics. It is in fact a survey of democracy in general, pursued with great detail in six cases which cover the Old World and the New, the ancient (Switzerland), the long-established (America), the relatively new democracy in an old country (France), and the new democracies in new countries (British Dominions). It covers various constitutional forms, the federative and centralized, the Parliamentary and Presidential, the societies of great class divisions and enormous contrasts, and those of simpler manners and more equitable distribution of wealth. The comparisons are wide and rich enough to exhibit many interesting points of agreement and difference, and the author is able to arrive at numerous general conclusions about democracy on a very different basis from those easy generalizations which have hitherto passed current in political discussion.

What then is the upshot, and how does it affect the great underlying question of the preservation of a civilized order? It is impossible to summarize satisfactorily in the course of an article, and the reader must be referred to the book itself—to the concluding Part if he cannot find time for more. The reviewer must content himself with recording his own most vivid impressions, and following some of the questions which seem to remain outstanding. On the whole matter then Lord Bryce's verdict seems to be this. Democracy is well enough, if you do not expect too much of it. It works no miracle. Now that it has been tested by time and by numerous instances no one could write of it with the Mazzinian glow. It does not alter human nature. Selfishness, shortsightedness, callousness remain what they were and play their part. In particular that "great heart of the people" beats but feebly. For at bottom the main defect of democracy is the comparative indifference of the majority to public interests. They will not take trouble. They will not give sustained continuous attention. There is much that in any case they cannot judge; for instance, the characters of men not known to them personally, complicated financial issues, or the bearing of a move in the diplomatic game. Nor are we to suppose that "pure art's birth is still the Republic's." Art and letters flourish, or decay, under all manner of institutions, under Louis XIV as under Pericles. Democracy neither destroys nor creates them. What is more serious, it has not reconciled peoples or classes. It has given something of liberty, and equality, but not fraternity. But after all, was it reasonable to expect that it should do these things? Why should it be supposed that the ordinary failings of mankind will be materially lessened by the

form of government any man lives under? Religion is a far more potent influence in the mind than government, but how little religion has done in public affairs! If democracy struggling for existence during, say, 140 years, is to be written down a failure, what are we to say of Christianity, supreme in European states for 1,600 years? (The question so put is the reviewer's but is suggested by much that the author says.) No, we must wipe these illusory claims off the slate, and only then does our real criticism begin. Forget the New Jerusalem, but enquire whether democracy is keeping the Old Jerusalem in fair tenable repair, as well or perhaps a little better than the old occupiers.

To this Lord Bryce answers in a cautious but sufficiently clear affirmative. Democracy has shown itself capable of performing the main functions of government, defence, order, justice, a competent executive. Not that it has done so always equally well. Order and justice in several American states leave a good deal to be desired. Even the French judicial system in its lower ranks fails to command general confidence. More widespread is a faulty economy combined with a foolish extravagance. Democracies have often so far misunderstood the meaning of equality as to suppose that one man can manage affairs as well as another. Hence they have refused sufficient payment for judges and civil servants, and have got inefficient administration and defective justice in consequence. On the question of corruption, however, Lord Bryce bears extremely interesting and valuable testimony to the improvement in the United States since his great book on that country was written. American democracy has great recuperative power, which in the long run is a richer asset than a tame impeccability. Nor has democracy shown itself incompetent in foreign politics. On the contrary, the great catastrophes have come from and through the military autocracies and oligarchies, and a succession of burning topics of the past century is set out in which the "masses" were nearer to the side justified by history than the "classes."

On the whole then democracy has given the world as good a government as its competitors. Has it also improved on them?

"Of democracy and happiness can more be said than this, that whatever governments can do to increase the joy of life is so slight . . . as to make the question not worth discussing on its positive side? With the negative side it is otherwise. The establishment of popular freedom has removed, or at least diminished, sources of fear and suffering which existed under more arbitrary forms of government. Freedom of thought and speech, if not everywhere the gift of popular government, has found its best guarantee in democratic institutions. . . . If we look back from the world of to-day to the world of the sixteenth century, comfort can be found in seeing how many sources of misery have been reduced under the rule of the people and the recognition of the equal rights of all. If it has not brought all the blessings that were expected, it has in some countries destroyed, in others materially diminished, many of the cruelties and terrors, injustices and oppressions that had darkened the souls of men for many generations."

Why has not democracy done more than this? Why has it not saved the world from unprecedented disasters? and why can we not trust it now to save us from the continuance of such disasters? We get some light on the question if we first ask, why did anyone ever expect it to do more? The answer to this question is in part that under the name of democracy a wide and a much narrower conception have been combined. Often the word stands for a far-reaching conception of life and society—for all that can be summed up in the phrase a free, co-operative commonwealth, all that seemed to follow from the lifting of the weight of class, sex, race or religious ascendancy, the releasing of the springs of spontaneous energy and common goodwill. If indeed such a society could be once realized on the grand scale, it would be something that the world has never yet known, and it would be reasonable to expect great things of it. But what experience has shown is that such an ideal is not achieved merely by the removal of certain gross and palpable barriers. The walls of Jericho may have fallen, but it is still Jericho and not a heavenly city that we enter. The ideal state was not to be attained by the simple method of establishing a form of government in which ultimate responsibility rested with the entire adult population. This is the narrower conception which conforms to the more literal meaning of democracy, and it was a mistake to transfer to this narrower meaning all the grace and glory of the ideal. The people in their millions were not going to act together like brothers all inspired by the divine wisdom, merely because they acquired the right to vote. The illusion was helped by the fact that men were fighting manifest evils and palpable cruelties and wrong in the name of democratic principle. They were fighting ascendancies, racial, national, religious, social, economic, sexual, and fighting them in the name of democracy. But it was an error to suppose that democracy as an established system of political government would be consciously and wholeheartedly set to destroy all such evils and to plead with the same public-spirited humanitarian and religious enthusiasm as the few who were giving their lives for its triumphs. The democratic machine might be made with hands, but the democratic spirit could not be provided ready made.

The more special and persistent cause of the over-estimation of democratic machinery is a piece of misapplied logic. In various forms people have been influenced by the analogy between the community and the individual. If the individual can on the whole govern his own life and pursue his own happiness, why not a community when once acting as a unit? Troubles in the community arose from the selfishness of man, the sectional interests of classes or groups, the spirit of ascendancy in rank, and of

influence in religion. Man being selfish and passionate, one individual will inflict wrong on another, one class on another, one section on another. But no man in his normal senses inflicts wrong upon himself. No more will a community inflict wrongs on itself. It will make mistakes, no doubt, as the individual makes mistakes, but in the main its face will be set always in the right direction. Every section of the community may have sinister interests, *i.e.*, interests against the community, but the community as such can have none. Its self-interest is also its true good, to promote it is the right and the duty of every one of its members. There is no fissure here between the prudential and the moral. The higher and the lower motives coincide. The selfish and evil wills cancel out against one another. The good and social remains, and has the field to itself.

This conception fails for two reasons, one being simple and obvious, the other so much more difficult to state clearly that it has occupied and is likely to occupy volumes of controversy. The simple reason is that the community no more stands alone than the individual stands alone. Self-interest is not a sufficient guide to the individual even if we allow him every possible measure of prudence, because he has to live and move among other individuals, and when he thinks first and foremost of himself he is not a pleasant neighbour. But if we are to compare the community with the individual at all it is clear that the comparison holds in this relation. The community is one among many. It has neighbours, friends, enemies, very often dependents. Will it be just, peaceable, forbearing, loyal, merely because it acts as one man? No more than the one man himself will be. There might be a high development of patriotic devotion within a community, accompanied, indeed even fortified, by rancorous enmities towards others, cruel sentiments of collective vengeance, or cold contempt for the rights of subject peoples. Democracy as such is no solvent of these vices. If confined to the dominant races, or to the independent sovereign state, imperial democracy becomes of itself an oligarchy. Sovereign democracy as one among many sovereigns may be as pugnacious or cynical as sovereign aristocracy.

But after all this is a criticism rather on partial democracy than on the democratic principle. For what is the democratic principle? Without assuming the realization of the great ideal described above, we must at least conceive it as aiming at the abolition of government by force and ascendancy, in favour of government by agreement and organized will. In principle the distinction between governors and governed disappears and is replaced by the distinction between an organized community and its ministers. Now, to carry this

principle through, humanity must be, in the first place, organized in suitable units; and, in the second place, provided with suitable machinery by which these units can co-operate for common purposes. This is no doubt the ideal which the world is now fumbling after, and not till something like this ideal is realized could the democratic principle receive a full and fair test. Short of it democracy is something broken and incomplete. Lord Bryce has not perhaps so much to say on this point as might be wished, for, excepting the case of France, the democracies with which he deals have been relatively free from foreign and imperial complications, but to the student of English democracy, I would suggest, external relations constitute the main problem. We could solve our internal questions if we had no external issues to distract us. We get a not unenlightened verdict from the constituencies, a not unreasonable public opinion on our own internal affairs, but touch questions of national pride or supposed safety, and national argument is at once lost in a whirl of passion. Too often at general elections the appeal has been from Philip sober to Philip drunk. It is a temptation to a popular government as it was to Henry IV, to escape from domestic discredit by raising the foreign or the imperial issue and appealing for consolidation of forces with the cry of "the empire in danger." I would put it therefore that the first great unsettled question about democracy is this. Understanding that democracy means self-government, is it possible to provide the mechanism by which self-government can be carried through? Can we establish self-government for the world as a whole? Can we establish self-government for the distinct communities into which history and geography have divided mankind? If we have to make exceptions and compromises can they at least be reduced within such compass as will leave the democratic principle dominant? These are the unsolved questions of the day. Let us at least clearly understand that unless and until they are solved democracy is but a partial principle haltingly and inconsistently applied, and that its failures may be due more to this incompleteness than to its inherent defects.

The second reason why a democratic community acts differently from an individual in relation to its own interest is, as has been said, more subtle and controversial. I will not attempt to set out the argument here, but must content myself with remarking that, while there are genuine resemblances between individual and collective mentality, there are also serious and deep-seated differences. Of the normal, sane individual we can generally predicate a will. It may not be a very wise or a very virtuous will, but it does ordinarily serve for the time being to give some intelligible unity of direction to his actions. Of the community it is not so easy to say that it is

normally in possession of a will. In fact it is most often in abnormal circumstances, such as war, that a true common will emerges, the reason being that it is when it is pitted against others that its members become most keenly aware that they form one body, or at least are all in one boat. One might take the whole of Lord Bryce's two bulky volumes as a running commentary on the difficulty of stimulating communities to form true wills. The difficulty is not what our forefathers feared that the admission of the masses would introduce a bad will, selfish, short-sighted, grasping, the difficulty is that too often there appears to be no will at all. No doubt some one within the community takes action and the common affairs somehow or other get themselves transacted, but the mass of the people—and here we are not meaning "mass" in any distinction from "class,"—simply do not take the trouble necessary to secure for themselves any real and effective participation in these decisions. Hence the tendency noted by Lord Bryce of democracy to relapse into a kind of natural oligarchy. Thucydides was the first to remark that what was in name a democracy had been in reality the rule of the first citizen, and whether it is one man or few, we must take this tendency as an inherent limitation on popular government. The seriousness of this limitation, however, must not be overstated. Lord Bryce very justly remarks that there is a deep distinction between what one may call the natural oligarchy of superior capacity, training and attention to public affairs, and the constitutional oligarchy of a privileged class. A democracy does perfectly right in committing administration to expert hands, indeed Lord Bryce shows very clearly that in some instances it would have done better to make more of the expert and to pay highly for his services. In the United States, in particular, one of the steps of progress that we note is the gradual replacement of the spoils system by a permanent civil service. A little democracy, as in the old world, or in a Swiss canton, may have sufficient knowledge of the limited number of questions with which it has to deal to enable it to dispense with skilled intermediaries and maintain direct self-government, but as communities increase in scale and complexity the system becomes unworkable, and democracy does best for itself by frankly realizing the situation. Its work must be supervision, not administration, and it will achieve intelligent supervision only by unloading itself of detail and confining itself to broad ends and governing necessities.

Yet this limitation raises some very lively controversies. In the first place, it means that democracy must after all lean in details of government on bureaucracy; and, in the second place, it can only control bureaucracy effectively through representative machinery. Till the other day it was in such control that democrats saw their

best hope. The most remarkable change in democratic feeling, which Lord Bryce duly notes, is the disillusionment with regard to representative assemblies. It was thought that the representative would be a picked man who could give just that detailed attention which was admitted to be beyond the power of the man in the street. The representative assembly would be the flower of the people, the ablest, most instructed, and most upright. The people would do its part in choosing such men. They would do their part in guiding the executive, keeping in close touch with detail, and insisting on principle. Each new election would bring a popular verdict on the way in which they had done their work. Perhaps at this moment we tend to exaggerate the degree in which the representative system has fallen short of this ideal, but the disappointment with the representative method is deep, and as Lord Bryce's book shows, widespread. No one could pretend that the present House of Commons, for example, represents the flower of the British nation. It represents a selection by certain qualities. Such selection is one form of success and the things making for success are in general a strange and unpredictable blend of the good, bad and indifferent. Without being unduly severe, we may put it that an election is not a competitive examination in moral wisdom. In particular it is not an examination in which either the thoughtful mind or the sensitive conscience get very high marks, and it is possible that a representative Parliament tolerates some things which a like number of men chosen by lot from the nation could not endure. Indeed, in choice of men democracy does not show itself at its best. How should it? Even in personal matters the choice of men is one of the most delicate and difficult human tasks. But if choice is a high art, even when there is considerable knowledge, what are we to expect of choice made on the basis of platform speeches, photographs in weekly papers, and a casual acquaintance with odds and ends in a candidate's public or private career? The data are ludicrously insufficient. Hence in sum representative assemblies are of very mixed character and too often fail in their function of consolidating public judgment and supervising administration in the interest of the common well-being.

Without abandoning democracy two main remedies have been proposed. The first is direct government, in legislation the initiative and referendum, in the executive direct election. As to the latter, Lord Bryce's verdict on American experience is tolerably clear. The election of many officials is utterly nugatory, for the simple and obvious reason that secondary men are insufficiently known. Hence by a Hegelian contradiction the more the choice of such officials is placed in the hands of the people, the less the power of the people to choose them. The inevitable selection is the party

machine which in the last analysis means a little oligarchy of log-rolling intriguers. With regard to high officials the case is not so clear. Many American cities have used the one-man power to clear away corruption, and on the whole it would seem with good effect. What democracy needs, Lord Bryce says, is the clear definition of responsibility, and the one man so elected is at any rate conspicuously responsible. This kind of democratic Caesarism, however, does not seem suited for permanent good government. It is too fortuitous, too much depends on the character of the Caesar, and in the American presidential contests, though certain aspects of personality count for a good deal, the machine seems to count for more.

Of direct government in legislation we have more than one form, the referendum, the initiative and particularly in America, constitution making, the enactment of laws as parts of the constitution. This method is very carefully discussed by Lord Bryce with results which are on the whole favourable for Switzerland and not altogether unfavourable for America. Attention is called in particular to the educative character of a direct popular vote which forces the citizen to think if anything can. Representative government performed an essential function in the development of modern democracy because without it there were no sufficient means of communication to enable people to meet and discuss common matters in the large territories occupied by modern communities. But the extraordinary improvements in communication are tending to reproduce the conditions of democracy in an ancient city state. The whole population of the United Kingdom, or of the United States can, if the press chooses to inform it, have all the data for a political judgment before it simultaneously, and, if events are sufficiently strong, an effective opinion can and does form itself rapidly throughout the land. The real trouble is that the press is an inadequate organ of information, and if we analyze the causes of this we must go behind the dispositions of great newspaper proprietors to that lack of sustained popular interest from which we started. The newspaper proprietors give the public what it wants. That is why they have succeeded. Broadly speaking, they find that what the public wants is sport, divorces, crimes, and a tincture of politics, made up of facile emotions, of which national vanities, fears, and hatreds are the most easily stimulated. Not only the comment, but, what is far more important, the selection and presentation of the news is shaped by the demand of these emotions. Hence the people do not get the full facts, at bottom because they prefer not to have them. As it was dangerous for the messenger of misfortune to tell the truth to an angry despot, so the newspaper which prints the bare unpleasant truth takes its life into

its hands. Still the thing can be done, and some truths percolate through at long last.

In any case through the rapid dissemination of printed matter we move towards a more direct democracy, not merely in the formal and constitutional manner of referendum and initiative, but more generally in the appeal from Government and Parliament to public opinion. Hence the press becomes the most important organ of the constitution, and at present it does not work well. Unfortunately things move in a vicious circle for public opinion is defective because the press does not enlighten it, and the press does not enlighten it because its peculiar form of defect is to dislike enlightenment. Nor is the familiar remedy of more education a sound one. The educated classes supply in some respect the worst elements of public opinion, and support many of the worst measures. Give us someone to educate our educators and you may solve the problem. Otherwise bitter experience must be the teacher.

Of the other much discussed remedy for the failure of representative institutions, Lord Bryce has little to say. We may suppose that he would anticipate little from the transfer of the representative basis from the territorial basis to the vocational. For the vocational system it is contended that occupation provides an effective community of outlook, and vocational questions stir a real interest served by adequate knowledge. In the locality, on the other hand, all sorts come together, and the resulting opinion, if any, is that languid and uncertain compromise which gives us our tame democracy. Mr. Hobson, in his remarkable "Problems of a New World," has shown how the "classes," having satisfied themselves that by a little judicious arrangement democracy on these lines could be made "safe," were frightened beyond measure at the prospect of a vocational system which would introduce serious fighting by organized interests. Yet I wonder whether this terror is better grounded than that with which territorial democracy inspired their followers. For the vocational representatives would have to meet, and the Guild Congress would have ultimately to combine and compromise the divergent views. After all a community is one, and at some point adjustment—in which Dr. Bosanquet has seen the special function of the state—must be effected, unless of course constitutional methods dissolve into direct action and force. For common purposes would a representative body be improved by the fact that the members were avowedly chosen to represent sectional rather than common interests? Is it not rather the fact that that is so often done unavowedly which already reduces the value of our representative bodies? Vocational organization is of great and growing importance. In particular one may hope that, cutting across state divisions, it may provide

one avenue to effective internationalism. But from its nature it does not solve the problem of reconciling opposed interests, which is after all the underlying difficulty of every government.

Apart from the exaggerated economic inequalities in many countries, democracy is faced by three great difficulties. The first is the actual structure of the political world—the independent sovereign states, their anarchial relations, the failure up to the present to institute an effective League of Nations; and, again, within many states, the unsolved problems of nationalities and dependencies. For these difficulties there are definite solutions available, and sufficiently understood to be applied if there were the men with courage and imagination to do the work. Secondly, there is the exposure of the weaker, less organized, peoples to exploitation; and here again, though as Lord Bryce rightly maintains, advance must be tentative, there has been just enough experience to indicate the lines on which it should be tried. Thirdly, underlying the others, and the cause of their seriousness, there is the moral situation to which repeated reference has been made. If, on the one hand, there is too little of sustained interest in public things, on the other there have arisen an atmosphere of passion, a disbelief in reason, a worship of force, and a tendency to identify justice with weakness, which, if not countered, must in the end be destructive of any form of free government and liberal civilization. Nothing will go right as long as this temper is in the ascendant and platitudinous as it may sound, I am afraid the remedy here is no political stroke, but a definite change in the attitude of mind. The trouble appears to germinate with the “educated” classes, who, apparently in their dread of socialism have in large measure turned their backs on political freedom and sought the idealization which is necessary to man, in military glory or imperial achievement, finding justification for class ascendancy in biology, and for national domination in racial psychology. These classes have not fulfilled their function of giving a wise lead to democracy or in inculcating the restraint of popular passions. Too often it is just the contrary. Is it within the compass of hope that the certainty of eventual catastrophe on the lines on which we are at present moving may stimulate the “educated” minds to more detached methods of thinking and a more serious effort to fulfil the functions of suggestion, criticism and leadership which falls naturally within their sphere? At any rate it can only be by a complete reversal of the prevailing standards of judgment that the civilized order, as we have known it, can be saved.

L. T. HOBHOUSE.

EVERY MAN HIS OWN SOCIOLOGIST.¹

THE books of sociology used to speak more of family, tribe, nation, empire, civilization. Nowadays they speak rather of groups, associations and the State. But in either case too many of their observations and records were and are made without definite reference to time and place. In so far as our factual writings lack this necessary precision of data and locality, do they not belong rather to the anecdotes of table-talk than to the data, the hypotheses, the theories of science? Happily there are traditions of our science, not only free from this blemish, but specifically directed to its correction. One of them is that of Frederic Leplay, after whom the Society's new house is named. For an example and an epitome of this Leplay tradition, the first frieze on the northern wall of the Council room has been designed.² It shows a conventional version of what an airman might see in a flight over the Welsh hills and the great central plain of England. He would see men singly and in groups working at various occupations in certain kinds of place. The types of these elemental occupations and their respective places may be thus enumerated: fishing from the small harbours of the west coast, mining in the Welsh hills, wood-cutting in the forests, pursuit or preservation of game on moor and in woodland, shepherding on the pastures of the uplands, sowing, ploughing or reaping in the valley bottoms and on the plains, the cultivation of vegetables and fruits in the outskirts of the towns, and finally at the maritime eastern port our airman would see the concentration of an outward and an inward trade. Next after this synoptic view would come, in our sequence of social studies, the detailed observations and comparisons of Place, and Work and Folk to inform us of the characteristics and varieties of Fishermen, Miners, Foresters, Sportsmen, Shepherds, Peasants, Sailors. Then would follow two simple generalizations, almost platitudes. One is that what occurs or can be grown in a particular place determines what occupation shall there be engaged in. The other is that the qualities required for success in that occupation will tend to become fixed traits of the local inhabitants. Everyone, it may be said, knows all this without

1. Address to the Sociological Society at the formal opening of Leplay House.

2. The decorative frieze is the work of Miss Miette Hardy and Miss Lucille Hardy, except one panel by Mr. P. A. Mairet.

the aid of sociology. Certainly, but men of genius may forget essential parts of it when they philosophize; and so arise schools of thought that are one-sided. Thus the historic school of Montesquieu and Buckle, forgetting rustic labour (an easy omission of well-to-do townsmen), emphasize climate as the main determinant of race and civilization. The school of Karl Marx, forgetting the natural conditions of place (again an easy omission for readers in town libraries), insist on the all-importance of labour. Because it combines the two half-truths in these rival schools of thought, the tradition of Leplay is of first-rate aid in building up a social science at once objective, detached, verifiable. In short, with Leplay, we enter on a sociology in direct continuity with the more established sciences.

There is an anecdote of Leplay which well resumes the gist of his teaching. Asking his students once what was the chief thing that comes out of the mine, he was answered by some "coal," and by others "metals." "No," said Leplay, "the chief thing that comes out of the mine is the miner." This anecdote conveys more than a hint of the famous formula, *Place—work—folk*. And again this triply compounded word, if you will consent to go all the way with it, may transport you as on a magic carpet to the heart of evolutionary science. There, central to this frontier field of knowledge, will be found the thought, that Man can attain to lasting harmony in one way and one way only. It is by playing upon each and all of the three notes that compose the chord of Animate Nature. To make the music of one's life a continuing rhythm of Environment, Function, Organism (of Place, Work, Folk). That is the categorical imperative of evolutionary science.

As already said, it belongs to the tradition of Leplay that in making an observation, the student must ever remember to orient himself. Hence the position of this rustic frieze on the north wall of our Council room. If, facing this wall one had eyes to penetrate that and every other intervening obstacle, one might see the line of Welsh hills and valleys, the English plain and eastern coast which this rustic frieze generalizes and presents. Generalized a stage further its features and outline might stand for a conventional section drawn from hill-top to river mouth down any representative valley. Equipped with notebook and camera, and carrying in his head this conventionalized valley-section as working unit for observation and comparison, the sociologist begins to be an outdoor student like geologist and naturalist. There results for each worker in this growing tradition, his systematic gathering and presentment of facts, the Rustic Survey.

May not the student of social science be also an outdoor observer and investigator in towns and cities? Assuredly many are already

becoming so. Let us see what modes and apparatus of research are available of special adaptation to the purposes of the Civic Sociologist.

Turn then to the other frieze on our north wall. It represents the near civic view as against the more remote rustic one, if penetrating the wall we scan the immediate horizon. Ascending the flat roof of Leplay House one actually sees the panorama from which are selected the four panels of this frieze. On the few clear days when the fog screen has drifted away and the soot pall lifted, there is spread out to the gaze nearly the full extension of Westminster city, from riverside wharf at Millbank, up through the northern heights along Piccadilly, ranging down the long Brompton slope to its western limit in the high tower which marks the University and the Imperial Institute. In this phantasmagoria of teaming life, what are the significant things? The simple observations of the airman might be trusted in the countryside, but not in the maze of urban complexities. What guide then shall the social observer take for selection of his representative views? Following a dominant tradition of these days, he might first take note of the buildings and groupings which stand for Capital and Labour. Identifying (in the same limited tradition) the interests of Capital and of Labour with the Directing Classes and the Working Classes respectively, our observer would note that the political and administrative varieties of the former were vastly more in evidence than those which direct the course of Industry, Business and Finance. From the governmental groupings which well nigh fill the Whitehall sector of our Westminster panorama, let us select as a representative specimen the scene at the Admiralty Arch (panel I). For a typical scene of Labour, we might show the traffic at a riverside wharf of Millbank in the Pimlico district (Panel II). This, it may be said, is less representative of labour in Westminster than many other scenes, such, for instance, as a lorry delivering goods at a Bond Street shop; or busmen, taxi-drivers, railway porters at work in their respective modes and places; or again the scene inside one of the great gasworks, building yards, or printing shops. True, but the river is the original parent of both Labour and Capital in Westminster, as in London: so let us agree upon choice of the Millbank wharf scene as both geographically and historically representative of Labour in Westminster.

In their innumerable manifestations and disguises, Capital and Labour seem to exhaust the primary social categories, as many observers and thinkers see the world to-day. Yet commanding features in our Westminster panorama are the edifices of religion. Their towers, domes and spires, taken collectively, may even be said to dominate the picture. To be sure, the institutions thus

conspicuous in the architecture of the city are put aside by the prevailing schools of "economic interpretation" as historic survivals, which influence life for most people to-day in secondary ways only. Yet even if one accepts this criticism, there remain for consideration a whole host of what might be called partial substitutes for the historic religions. A sample of these current sources of emotional arousal, which at its best mounts and touches the sacred, is selected by our artist for presentation in panel III of the civic frieze. The scene is laid on a sunny June afternoon in the Embankment Gardens, when a public performance of music gathers the common folk to converse and perambulate in holiday costume amid flower beds, lawns, shrubberies and statuary, with their background of architecture impressive to the multitude, if not always satisfactory to the aesthete. In the foreground of this enlivening milieu is a typical trio whose interlinked feelings, thoughts, instincts, hopes, fears, supply in no small measure the raw material of religion. This young married couple, for the moment have their attention engaged by the infant occupant of the perambulator. There may, however, be seen in the seat just vacated by the solicitous father, a copy of Mr. Wells' "Outline of History." That is a detail not without significance as token of a man's spiritual interests. But it is the general situation of the family trio which calls for interpretative thought. They have chosen this way of spending their half-holiday because it promised an inner satisfaction, an energizing and enhancement of the inner life. Must it not be said that, given their upbringing, outlook, and opportunities, they are making the most of the public resources available to them towards the cultivation of that subjective life that makes for harmony of the soul?

Now about this inner state of personality in the life of the common folk two things would be generally admitted. One is that "harmony of the soul" is neither a "business proposition," in the world of "Capital," nor a plank in the programme of "Labour." The other is that the efficiency of the historic churches in this cure of souls is somewhat less than it might be. Assume that the high charge of the secular clergy is to energize the heart and tranquilize the mind of the common folk. Yet is it not a simple fact of everyday observation that this "emotionalizing" of the people at large in their daily round, in so far as it is done at all, is performed less by the churches than by a miscellaneous and unrelated set of lay organizations? Music hall, theatre, concert room, picture gallery, museum, cinema palace, lecture hall, public garden, each does something in its own manner towards beating a common track to life abundant through the jungle of current art, literature and science. But how to unite all these dispersive efforts

into one harmonious ritual of life? To do that creative service in each generation, and for the common folk more especially, belongs to the rôle of those whom the sociologist calls the "Emotionals" of the Spiritual Power. And the suggestion of the garden scene in our civic frieze is that the gardeners, musicians, sculptors, architects (not forgetting either the civic guardians or their representatives at the tea-serving and the refreshment stalls, and remembering also the author of "The Outline of History") collectively responsible for the holiday entertainment did effectively constitute, for the occasion, a group of ministrants serving the common folk as practising Emotionals of the Spiritual Power of the day. To be sure something vastly greater is needed to bring into unison and orchestrate for public service the symbols of living art, the imagery of contemporary literature, the truths of verified science. Do the historic churches not owe their prestige to the fact that once they did attain to a vision which served the people of the day for unison of life and labour? And clear amongst the conditions of such fulfilment stands out its indispensable intellectual element. Effectively incorporated into the Church in its militant days was the learning and the science of the time. Looking round our Westminster panorama for tokens of the functional "Intellectuals" of the Spiritual Power, we have again to note that merely fragmentary instances would seem to be discoverable. Conspicuous amongst the symbols of these is the University Tower, and this with its incipient cloister has been chosen for the fourth panel of our civic frieze. A student sitting in solitary meditation and a couple in active discussion may serve as reminders that such are the traditional modes of the intellectual process.

It will, of course, be understood that the university in this panel is selected for promise of purpose in the future, rather than fact of performance in the present. The university stands but as a symbol and representative of a whole host of groups and institutions scattered throughout Westminster and awaiting the coming synthesis of knowledge to unite them into a living cloister of effective service to the community. To mention but a few of these fragmentary items of the disrupted speculative life: there are the Learned Societies of Burlington House and elsewhere; the Libraries ranging from the great power house in St. James' Square to the barrow of second-hand books in the street markets of Pimlico; there are Research bodies from the Royal Institution in Albemarle Street, to the Labour Party's Bureau in Eccleston Square; there are discussion groups ranging from the august solemnity of the British Academy to the lively informalities of the People's Forum at Hyde Park Corner on a Sunday forenoon. All these and more are the dispersed Intellectuals of an incipient Spiritual Power.

The commonsense view, which is also the sociological reading of history, is that if these isolated Intellectuals could be brought into a common cloister they would more effectively serve in the birth-aiding of the needed Spiritual Power.

But this aspiration towards social unison must be put aside for the moment lest its practical urgency be permitted to bias the studious interest. The detachment of mood necessary for accurate observation and valid generalization has to be won by persistence in the habit of dissociating the practical from the speculative life. To be sure such divorce of knowledge from life carries its own serpent-like perils, to be met and countered by very deliberate application, later on, of the truths thus won, towards a finer art of living.

Whoever has seriously tried to discern truly and observe accurately the essential facts of (say) politics, religion, business, soon discovers for himself the two chief obstacles to the progress of social science. One is the distortion of prejudice insidiously distilled into the mind by the bias of personal interests and those of class, nation, race. The other is the need of a really detached (*i.e.*, scientific) scheme of analysis for guidance in the selection of essential facts and their orderly arrangement. Without such aid the discriminating powers of even the most careful observer are likely to be helpless in face of the "big booming buzzing confusion" around and within us.

Now there is more than traditional reason for making use of the fourfold social analysis illustrated in our civic frieze. Within its framework of observation has been fitted a very considerable body of research into the history of civilization. But more attractive to the student of contemporary life, and especially to the out-door student, is the facility it offers for orderly factual observation of the institutional and group activities, inhibitions, repressions, perversions, idealisms, enthusiasms, devilries, whose interplay make the day-to-day drama of city, state, nation, empire. To note and record the personalities of such groups and their doings as expressions of contending Temporal and Spiritual Powers, each with its own order of Chiefs, People, Emotionals and Intellectuals—to practice this kind of observation is at once to cultivate the mood of pure science and to advance the sociological movement. So may our Civic Surveys continue and supplement our Rustic Surveys; the former developing and correcting the apparent simplicities of the latter. It is to be assumed that only in the measure of our civic and rustic surveys getting generalized and integrated into an authentic sociology, can we hope to diagnose truly the ills that beset modern civilization and thus work towards their cure.

There are many prescriptions for this healing of the distracted

modern mind. Some excellent people believe that the curative secret lies concealed in the discarded jack boot of Prussia. Others of no less admirable intention put their faith in the wooden sabots of the workman. But do not both these remedies, in so far as their authors claim for them moral and intellectual authority, equally belong to a tradition that exalts its Cæsar as Divus? To be sure we live in a world of uncertainties, but this at least may be accepted, that Temporal Powers cannot do the work of Spiritual ones, nor, *vice versâ*. And let us not forget that any Spiritual Power must seemingly have its correlated groups of specialized outlook and inlook, inadequate, even misleading though it be to call them with the sociologist "Emotionals" and "Intellectuals." These needs and distinctions, deep in the nature of things, compel to the declaration that there is one way, and only one, to intellectual unity, and that is by the narrow and thorny path of verifiable synthesis. The way to emotional unison and so onwards towards practical concord in industry and politics is less clear. But wherever lies the course of social harmony, it is the dictum of that tradition which is resumed in our civic frieze that the four integral social groups must tread it together, if a satisfactory destination is to be reached. As the tradition of rustic sociology is historically associated with the name of Leplay, so with this civic tradition there goes the initiating name of Auguste Comte.

Beyond these two historically central ones, there are many other traditions, as yet imperfectly combined into the body of general sociology. For instance, can it be seriously maintained that the concept of Evolution has been adequately incorporated into sociological thought and observation? If not, that surely is a fatal omission. Towards correcting it, let us first recall the name of Spencer, somewhat discredited though it be, and next let us associate with Spencer's work that of Francis Galton, who is a main link binding the social sciences with the biology of Darwin.

Now it is necessary to enquire coolly and critically what from the human standpoint is the gist of the evolutionary doctrine. Its place and meaning in sociology have had many different interpreters. There is doubtless some truth in each of their interpretations. Assemble at a round table a group of representative individuals chosen from the seers of evolution, listen to their respective versions of man's past, present and future; and mark their plans (if any) for advancing his possibilities of evolution, arresting his habits of deterioration and hindering his degeneration. The Darwinian has right of first speech. Says he, "I observe that the human is but one of innumerable species inhabiting our planet, and I see all of them arising in an infinite welter of changes manifested by the one Proteus of Life, with its tendency under all

disguises to reproduce and multiply beyond the possibilities of complete survival. I observe the human species struggling for food and shelter against other species and against a harsh environment; I see strife of individuals and groups within the species, competing for every object of desire, material and immaterial, honourable and base; and I note, according to circumstances, the victory of the strong, the cunning, the wise, the gentle, the meek, the beautiful, the sociable, the unsociable, with resulting transmission of like characters, whether by organic descent or by social inheritance. I observe the rivalry of males competing for mates, with the results entailed by this lesser strife within the greater. The inference of my massed and ordered observations is that adaptation to environment through struggle is the inmost characteristic of the changeful Proteus. As for its manifestation in Man, and the resulting drama of human development, I see no reason for making plans; I am too engrossed in the absorbing spectacle of Nature's drama, which for me holds, envelops and absorbs Man and all his works."

Next let the Spencerian speak. Says he, "I take over and adopt in full all the observations of the Darwinian. But for myself I have little taste for the labour of observational research. I prefer to sit in my study and meditate. And when I reflect on the forces of change, I perceive also the forces of stability and a tendency to their balance. In regard to the human species this tendency to a balance of adjustment between organism and environment, between Population and Subsistence, shows itself in a marked way. It is a supreme characteristic of human evolution that there proceeds together a growth of personality and a diminution of reproductive power. This tendency holds prospect of a future for man as splendid in its perfection as his origin was lowly and his past is humble. But it is a condition of reaching this perfected human state of the future that the grand law of Individuation varying inversely with Reproduction be left to work itself out in its own way. In particular I declare no plans should be made by politicians for hastening the ultimate denouement, since all their plans hitherto, I discover, to have had the reverse effect."

Next arises the Galtonian. Says he, "what strikes me most about the human species is the poor appearance of so many individuals in physique. This to an evolutionist is contrary to all nature. For when you look at other species (the world of parasites excepted) you see that the average, normal and ordinary specimen is not only a physically fit individual but is also a beautiful creature. Indeed, the very meaning of evolution is that the whole species marches together; and so an evolutionist is bound to assume a potency in each individual to be and to do what

the species is and does. Hence when an evolutionist observes a few beautiful noble, healthy members in the human species, and many lacking these qualities, he is bound to assume that the former are the normal individuals and exhibit the natural characteristics of the species; and that the latter, for some peculiar and exceptional reason have failed to develop the finer latencies which are in them, or have somehow perverted them. Indeed, the frequency of poorly developed or deteriorate specimens raises the question whether even the fine specimens are really representative of the highest potentiality of the human species. Evolutionists ought therefore to find out by research and experiment what are the highest latencies of evolution in man, and why all the members do not develop at least up to the level of the best extant specimens. When research and experiment have gone further into the determination of these problems, we can make our plans for the future."

Finally we must listen to the Comtist exponent of evolution, for the Positivist reading of human development is in everything but name a doctrine of evolution. Says he, "It is true that the human species is like all others in its organic life. But it is radically and profoundly marked off from all others in one respect. It has discovered a unique way of accumulating the experience of past generations and transmitting it for the benefit of the present and the future. This Social Heritage of impressions, experiences, feelings, ideals, thoughts, imagery is the supreme product of the evolutionary process. It is the most complex thing in the world known to man. And because the most complex, it is also by a happy law of nature, the most open to human control. What we call history, as distinct from organic development, is the record of many minor efforts and of two great experiments in the control of the social heritage. The first of these magistral efforts towards mastery and guidance of human destiny was a joint control by soldiers and theologians; who still enjoy a large share in management and direction of the social heritage. Mingling with this first thought-out and ordered experiment came the next; which is the dominant authority to-day. It is a joint management and direction by politicians, lawyers and abstract thinkers. From the successes and the failures of these two systematic endeavours in the use and transmission of the social heritage, we have to devise a third system which will continue and develop the qualities and abate or eliminate the defects of the previous orders. As to detailed plans to this end, we should very distinctly separate those concerned with the material fabric of life from those of immaterial interests. The former plans should be exclusively in the hands of statesmen and the magnates of industry, themselves educated first by women, and afterwards by men of the moral, intellectual and æsthetic tradition,

in whose sole charge should be the plans for religion, education, science and the fine arts. To work towards the discovery and practice of an effective and correlative Temporal and Spiritual Power for our times is the supreme human problem and task."

To the voices of our evolutionary quartet we might add other interpretations of man and nature, other visions of life. But turn back rather to the great masters already mentioned and endeavour to see them in their simple human relations. Test them and their doctrines together by the measure of the child's mind in its phases of growth and moods of expanding personality. Does it not belong to the nature of genius that the Great Man be used as a mirror wherein "you" and "me" may see and read ourselves as we might be if nature and nurture were a trifle more generous in bestowing the conditions of perfection. Some pictures to illustrate these aspects of human evolution are placed on the overmantel of the Council Room. Adjacent to the rustic frieze is placed Miss Larcher's vivid presentation of a child gazing from a hilltop in wondering outlook upon the river that winds in the valley below. Here surely is a perfect symbol of the scientific mind in its mood of observation and wonder. Indeed must one not rather say that this child on the hilltop is less a symbol than the realized intention of the scientist in the first of his many moods? His indispensable prerequisite is to see things as they are, naturally, simply, directly, without bias from the disturbances and prepossessions of the adult mind. And next, following the child also, the scientist would acquire and possess that disposition of mind in which the mood of wonder plays freely on the images recorded by the retina. Is it not plain that in this child on the hilltop we have a Darwin in the making? And, *per contra*, are not too many Darwinians but adults whose own evolution is arrested by premature fixation and consequent withering of the child habit of observation and wonder?

On the opposite side of the mantelpiece, and therefore adjacent to the civic frieze, is presented another phase and mood of the child mind. Impressions having been stored and wonder aroused by contact with nature, the ground is prepared for that process of meditation to which the darkened closets of town dwellings are the fitting milieu. The "infant philosopher" of the sculptor is surely a Spencer in the making; and Spencer and his too static philosophy of evolution but express an arrestment by fixation of the indoors habit of reflecting without due alternation of active outdoor life.

To the three notes of Observation, Wonder, Meditation, others must be added, to make the full chord of science, and also of the child mind. One of them is the note of Experiment; and here the mood is no longer merely receptive, or somewhat passively creative, but the whole being is intense with the eagerness of purposive

action. Can there be found for sociological reference a better representation of the experimental mood than the Boy Scout? Who so keen to explore the realm of man's interaction with nature? Who more ready to risk, in actual experiment, the trials of failure or to foresee the triumphs of attainment? In his smart uniform, and with his keen, handsome face and well-set-up body, is not the boy scout himself that very vision of individual life which Galton saw as the norm of our species? Given a thoroughgoing education of the countryside, with its mastery of the tools and the crafts that have made the material fabric of civilization, and so by repercussion in no small measure moulded the human mind, the boy scout is manifestly a rustic sociologist in the making.

What figure can we find of similar significance in the civic tradition? The camp-fire girl, and her primitive tools and utensils may seem not less in the rustic tradition, but even more than the boy scout. Yet it would be admitted that in her knapsack is more likely to be found, amongst the younger girls, a fairy story, and amongst the older ones a volume of poetry. But the fairy book is at once primitive token of the social heritage, and symbol of its romantic use in recalling the past for inspiration of the present. The volume of poetry expresses at its highest, man's perennial endeavour to sift the social heritage, select its choicest products and combine them into arousing visions of life abundant.

Now what fairy stories and poetry are to the camp-fire girl, that the arts, sciences, histories, literatures, religions are to the sociologist who labours in the Comtist tradition. They are the half-shaped stuff of a fuller application of the social heritage to an orderly march through the present into a finer future. So may we not see in a "camp-fire girl" and her equipment a further promise of that vision of social life which the civic sociologist glimpses in his evolutionary illumination?

Let us then set up the boy scout and the camp-fire girl not only as reminder of the experimental mood, but also to recall that there are many traditions of this order awaiting to be incorporated in the body of sociological thought.

Think, for instance, of Robert Owen. He was resolute consciously to apply in definite and orderly experiment what he took to be the extant social knowledge of his day. And who shall say that, whatever his omissions, blunders and failures, we are not immensely the richer for his efforts at practical regeneration? It is hardly an exaggeration to claim that the movements of Co-operation, Factory Legislation, Trade Unionism, Garden-city-making, and Socialism are offspring of his endeavours. To mention some other representative names of like experimental tradition, there are Turgot, with his political reconstructions in Limoges, Condorcet

and his educational endeavours in the French Revolution, and Goethe with his ordered civic efforts at Weimar.

The labours of all these and many other pioneers of an applied social science await criticism, appraisal and incorporation in the tradition of experimental sociology, along with older endeavours and later ones, like current experiments in social transmission by craft schools, such as that of Professor Findlay. For symbol and reminder of this rich field calling for a fuller survey and cultivation we need a central picture to go between those of the boy scout and the camp-fire girl. Amidst many that suggest themselves the old Temple of Vesta in early Rome has been chosen, because it is manifestly a central link in the long series of human efforts towards a civilization that ascends from Round Hut to Cathedral and University as respectively heart and brain of the culture city. Thus may be seen meeting and blending in that old Roman temple something of the two supreme achievements of the human race. And to renew Hellenic unity of knowledge and art, Hebraic unity of the moral and the physical order, and both on the rising spiral of modern knowledge and resource—is not that our supreme need to-day? It is surely this very aim to which the housewife aspires in the making of her Home. Thus is not every Home to-day, when taken in civic intention, a miniature Temple of Vesta in the making? The problem of civilization, of the city, and of the home, when historically and concretely stated, is thus seen as one and the same. So does our central symbol become charged with a meaning that ranges all the way between the personal and the social, the arcane and the historic, the primitive and the modern.

At the risk of crowding our mantelpiece its pictures are flanked at each end by a pair of globes. One of them shows the natural features of the planet, its oceans and seas with their varying depths roughly indicated, its land forms and their contours similarly marked. This globe stands on the left and represents the unity of that natural world which the valley section of the rustic frieze analyses into portions, suitable for detailed study by the specialisms called anthropology and economics, yet also in form adapted to the more general study we term sociology. Each of the many multiplying specialisms necessitated by the complexity of the social world and its physical environment, needs for incorporation in general sociology a functional symbolism of linkage devised for this double purpose. Increasingly does the geographer serve as an intermediary through whom the more naturalistic specialisms make their contribution to general sociology and receive from it in turn. On the geographer the oneness of the globe impresses that sense of unity which is apt to be lacking in the more specialized studies. On the other side, that of the humanist tradition, the rôle

of synthetic intermediary is increasingly played by the historian. The more such "sub-sciences" as social psychology, ethics and æsthetics are presented in historic development, the more they become ready for incorporation in general sociology, if only because we thus see that behaviour, conduct, taste, are phenomena that exhibit less of an unvarying absolute, and more of varying adjustment to the tone and pitch of their era. The treatment of political philosophy by the historic method has perhaps gone furthest amongst the humanist group of sub-sciences. And if the practical results seem lamentable, to judge from the state of Europe to-day, that is open to various interpretations. One is that notwithstanding their historical treatment there has been as yet no adequate incorporation of political studies into any general science of society worth the name. The failure reflects alike on political science and on sociology, and still more perhaps on the historian in his part as intermediary.

For reminder and symbol of the double tradition of specialized variety and synthetic unity in the realm of humanist learning, a political globe stands adjacent to our civic frieze, and thus supplements the naturalist globe adjacent to the rustic frieze. What the geographer's valley section is to the natural globe, so it is claimed the social analysis of the civic frieze is, or may become, to the political globe. At any rate, it is a provisional contribution to that purpose largely from the side of history, but owing something also to the plain-man's kind of history called folklore, and to the poet's kind of history called myth.

Following the phrasing of Comte, we called the four integral groupings of the social situation Chiefs, People, Emotionals and Intellectuals. That analysis was the last word of the old-fashioned study called "philosophy of history" which before expiring gave birth to sociology. But the same four social types under other names appear in the poetic vision of Plato and in the objective research of Aristotle.¹ In a conventional presentation possibly still

1. With the four types given in sociological analysis may be compared the Guardians, Artisans, Poets, Philosophers of Plato's *Republic*, and the Citizens, Labourers, Teachers, Philosophers of Aristotle's *Politics*. Mr. H. G. Wells, it may be remembered, in his *Modern Utopia*, makes two main types, viz., Kinetics and Poietics. And each of these again is sub-divided into Actives and Passives. Thus his Actives and Passives of the Kinetic types may be compared with the Chiefs and Peoples of the Temporal Power; and his Actives and Passives of the Poietic types, with the Emotionals and Intellectuals of the Spiritual Power. Mr. Arnold Bennett, in a descriptive essay of war-time sociology, observed that in the Clyde shipyards men sorted themselves into four types which he called Organisers, Workers, Energisers, Initiators, an independent factual verification of the sociological analysis of what might be called the *Functional Group*.

more ancient they would seem to appear as the four suits of our playing cards. Manifestly the "club" is a representative of the "People," and the "spade" is but a misreading of the Spanish *espada*, a sword, the weapon of the "Chief"; while "diamonds" and "hearts" are obvious symbols of the "Intellectuals" and "Emotionals" respectively. To find in the folklore of games the rudiments of science may be taken as verification of the contained truth and doubtless also a rating of the method called scientific! May we not therefore fittingly conclude our game of sociological analysis by noting that each of our two globes is borne on a pedestal faced with a couple of playing cards? They are of somewhat unconventional design, but there will be recognized below the natural globe the aces of clubs and spades, and below the political globe, hearts and diamonds. The suggestion is first, the obvious one that the People and the Chiefs of the Temporal Power, are the Atlas that supports the material fabric of our world; and that the Emotionals and Intellectuals of the Spiritual Power do a somewhat similar service of maintenance for the immaterial world of our inner life. Next, turning the two globes and their pedestals through half a circle one recognizes an exhibit of what previously was invisible in the background, viz., the complementary pair of social types. The unity of the social whole is thus at once reaffirmed and declaration is made of the mutuality of the temporal and the spiritual, the interdependence of the material and the immaterial, the interaction of the inner and the outer life.

Our rustic and civic frieze taken with the pictures and apparatus of the overmantel are collectively intended to indicate and in a sense outline, current resources in the way of impulse, method and purpose, available for sociological study. Next comes the question of the practical use of these resources in tackling the actual and concrete problems of the science. The other decorations of the Council Room are meant to illustrate their application towards an open-air study first of Westminster, Oxford and Chelsea, as types of culture-city in our contiguous region, and next of the Thames Valley as itself a typical region for the concrete approach to sociology. In other rooms of Leplay House an endeavour is being made to apply the same modes of study to illustrative examples further afield. Not a few beginnings of actual surveys, rustic and civic, have been brought together. These need continuing, multiplying, comparing, compounding, generalizing. The more the students of social science can be got to work along these concrete approaches, the nearer we move to a living sociology. That is the way of science. It contrasts with the dubious abstractions of all the "isms" which go to the making of current politics. Below those vague abstractions, alike economic and political, lie the

realities of Town and Country and the latencies of Personality and Community. To make intelligible and explicit, these vital elements and spiritual potencies of every complex situation is the practical aim of rustic and civic surveys.

With such resources growing quantitatively and systematically, together with an increasing assemblage of books and papers, maps, charts and other documents requisite to the more conventional approaches to the science, it is hoped that Leplay House will, in course of time, develop an organization that may justify the claim and aspiration "Every man his own Sociologist."

NOTE ON THE DOUBLE PERSONALITY OF HERBERT SPENCER.

A word as to presumption of conflict between the appreciation of Herbert Spencer in the above paper, and the account of his doctrine given in "The Drift to Revolution." It has to be remembered that there was more than one Spencer. There was the Railway Engineer, the sub-editor of the *Economist*, the student of physical science and of *Laissez-faire* politics, the hard and determined egotist. There was also the vitalist (even one touched with human mysticism), the lover of music, the appreciator of children, the admirer of Mary Ann Evans, the student of organic, mental and social science, of Von Baer, Lamarck and Comte. By generalizing the experience and thought of Spencer No. 1, and vastly overweighing it, he got his cosmic philosophy of a mechanistic evolutionism. By generalizing the other experience and thought, he gained his vision of organic evolution as a rhythm of self-regarding and other-regarding instincts and tendencies. And in the overtones of this rhythm he discerned the dawning of transcendent harmonies. Above all did he perceive in man, culminating product of the evolutionary process, latencies of personality capable of blending the inner strife of instincts into a balanced perfection of life. But how reconcile this vital and even spiritual view of evolution with the mechanistic and competitive one? How indeed except by pausing, patiently and persistently to seek further illumination? Yet it is a common trick of the mind to suppress and forget the elements of one mood that do not square with those of another. This is a very human habit of mind; but its practice becomes, as it were, systematized in periods of transition. The plain-man of our modern transition has acquired the habit of suppressing and forgetting easily and often (with or without the aid of a little stimulant); and he pays for his facility by a growing disharmony of soul. More cultivated persons fix and stereotype the moods of partial insight by recourse to elaborate artifice. Some make an imposing "rationalization," and call it now Philosophy, now Science. Others compose verbal melodies in the music of fancy and call it Literature; believing, as Renan remarked, that language in its way is a religion. Herbert Spencer "rationalized" his mood of mechanistic utilitarianism and was able to persuade himself and his generation that it was both Philosophy and Science, because in that

mood he so fully represented and expressed the dominant spirit of his time. Is it not apparent too that in another respect he is also a representative figure of the utilitarian and industrial age? Does he not illustrate its characteristic tendency towards dissociation of personality by cleavage of the mind into an outer court of circumstance and an inner chamber wherein the soul immures itself to pursue one or more of several courses. It may build a tinsel castle in fairyland. But that will not save it in the long run from a harsh fate. Cut off from its proper work of moral nourishment and spiritual direction to the outer life, the soul will sooner or later languish of inanition, or wilt under the distress of repression, or in reaction flame into the evils of perversion. It is the task and the privilege of psychologist and sociologist jointly to aid the traditional guardians of the soul in thinking out and designing interactions of Folk, Work and Place, of Polity, Culture, Art, that will prevent these evils, by evoking and developing the contrary qualities of life.

SOME CONTRIBUTIONS OF AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGY TO MODERN SOCIAL AND POLITICAL THEORY.

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1. INTRODUCTORY REVIEW OF PSYCHOLOGICAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO SOCIAL AND POLITICAL THEORY.

IN an unsigned editorial article in the *New Republic* for March 1, 1919, a writer, presumably either Mr. Walter Lippmann or Mr. Harold J. Laski, well stated what is rapidly coming to be the prevailing view with respect to the dependence of political policy and theory upon the teachings of psychology:—¹

We are, after all, dealing with an eminently human set of facts; yet there are few teachers who emphasize the impossibility of understanding political phenomena without a grasp of psychology. There are, indeed, few who do not know the change in perspective since Mr. Wallas drove the Benthamite psychology out of the political field. But, to take an obvious instance, we cannot explain the very fact of political obedience unless we are fully equipped with the latest knowledge psychology can offer. Do men obey, as Hobbes said, through fear? Is the real basis consent, as with Rousseau; or habit, as with Sir Henry Maine? The answer to this, and all kindred questions, we shall only know if we try fully to grasp and cautiously to apply, the things we are being taught by men such as Freud and Jung, McDougall and the behaviourists. It ought to be understood that no student is equipped for serious analysis except upon the basis of a thorough acquaintance with these studies.

It will be the purpose of these articles briefly to survey the contributions made by the founders of American psychological sociology to a better understanding of the psychological factors involved in political processes and institutions and in the phenomenon of political obedience. In view of the necessary limitations of space nothing like an adequate survey of the history of American social psychology or of the political doctrines of American sociologists can be attempted. Attention will be concentrated upon the significance for political theory of the cardinal psychological or sociopsychological doctrines of the writers considered.² As far as space will permit significant citations from leading writers will be frequently included.

1. *Loc. cit.*, p. 138.

2. The necessity in articles of this sort of a differentiation between the scattered views of a writer on political problems and his specific contributions to social and political psychology is well exemplified by the case of William Graham Sumner. His voluminous writings on political topics are based chiefly on Spencerian biological sociology or American political history, and bear but a remote relation to his remarkable body of social psychology contained in his *Folkways*. See the article on Sumner's political theory in the *American Journal of Sociology* for July, 1919.

I have sought to indicate the bearings of French and English psychological sociology on political theory in a series of articles in *The Philosophical Review*, May 1919; *The Political Science Quarterly*, June 1920; *The American Journal of Psychology*, October 1920; and *The American Journal of Sociology*, 1921.

While one may accept Dr. Davis' statement that "psychological sociology as we now know it is extremely recent,"¹ it by no means follows that the psychological interpretation of social and political processes is of recent origin. Aristotle, in his *Ethics*,² introduces his readers to a discussion by ancient Greek philosophers of the problem whether men prefer the society of those who resemble them or that of those who differ from them. The similarity of this to the discussions twenty-five years ago respecting the validity of Professor Giddings' theory of the "consciousness of kind" will be evident to all familiar with the development of sociological theory. Aristotle's own doctrine of the instinctive sociability of men, which was adopted by the Stoics, Cicero, the Church Fathers and the Scholastic philosophers, was a distinctly psychological interpretation of society and an anticipation of Trotter.³ One might further call attention to his acute psychological analysis of the bureaucratic spirit, of the effect of the possession of property, of political revolutions, and of the instability of the masses. Polybius contributed a striking anticipation of the theory of reflective sympathy developed later by Spinoza, Hume and Adam Smith, and of the notions of Bagehot and Sumner with respect to the evolution of customs and folkways.⁴ A dim foreshadowing of Stanley Hall is evident in the basic concepts of Epicurus and Lucretius.⁵ The contract theory of political and social origins, which had a distinguished history from Epicurus to Blackstone and Kant, was distinctly a psychological conception.⁶ Thomas Hobbes set forth a trenchant psychological interpretation of the basis of social and political institutions and processes, particularly stressing the element of fear as the foundation of political obedience.⁷ Spinoza touched upon the sociological significance of reflective sympathy and prepared the way for Hutcheson, Hume and Adam Smith.⁸

John Locke, in his discussion on "the law of fashion or private censure," anticipated Sumner and Trotter by holding that the law of group custom and fashion was more powerful in its psychological pressure than the laws of God or the state.⁹ Berkeley attempted to adapt the Newtonian terminology to a psychological interpretation of social processes.¹⁰ Hume made important contributions to the socio-psychological significance of sympathy and

1. M. M. Davis, *Psychological Interpretations of Society*, p. 33.

2. *Op. cit.*, Book VIII, Chap. 1.

3. *Politics*, I, 2.

4. *History of Rome*, trans. by Schneeburgh, VI, 5-6.

5. *De rerum natura*; Cf. Maasson, *Lucretius, Epicurean and Poet*, and H. F. Osborn, *From the Greeks to Darwin*, pp. 60-62.

6. P. Ager, *L'Histoire des doctrines du contrat social*.

7. *Philosophical Rudiments concerning Society and Government; Leviathan*; Cf. Graham Wallas, *The Great Society*, p. 191.

8. *Ethics*, Part III, prop. xxvii.

9. *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, Fraser edition, Vol. I, p. 479.

10. "The Principles of Moral Attraction," *Works*, Fraser edition, Vol. IV, pp. 131-18.

imitation.¹ Adam Smith's analysis of sympathy was of sufficient thoroughness and insight to lead Professor Giddings to characterize Smith as the founder of psychological sociology.² The first systematizers of sociology, Comte and Spencer, make a liberal use of suggestive psychological concepts. Comte's bio-psychic interpretation of social unity, his psychological interpretation of history and progress, and his emphasis upon feeling as the dynamic power in society are commonplaces in the history of sociology.³ Spencer's powerful statement in his *Study of Sociology* of the relation of psychology to sociology, and his contributions to the psychology of primitive man are equally well-known.⁴

In spite of these notable anticipations of the modern psychological sociology, the more significant phases of the subject have been developed since the time of Comte. Sir Henry Maine and the legalists stressed the sociological influence of habit in building up social institutions and insuring respect for constituted authority.⁵ An attempt was made by certain German writers, of whom Röhmer, Stein and Gierke are representative, to apply concepts similar to those of Comte and Spencer to a classification of the psychological stages of political development and to the elaboration of the notion of the state as a psychic personality.⁶ George Henry Lewes, an admirer of Comte and a contemporary of Spencer, gave the first clear and definite statement to the notion of the unity of the social mind,⁷ while Adolf Bastian carried the conception still further to establish the unity of the human mind.⁸ The newly-awakened interest in folk-psychology, which proceeded from philosophical, philological and anthropological antecedents, was given a great impetus through the foundation of the *Zeitung für Völker-Psychologie und Sprach-Wissenschaft* by Lazaraus and Steinhil in 1860, and was carried further from widely different standpoints by such men as Theodor Waitz, Charles Letourneau, E. B. Tylor, D. G. Brinton and Wilhelm Wundt.⁹ Then came the attempt of Lester F. Ward and Simon N. Patten to readapt hedonism to serve as the psychological basis of

1. *A Treatise of Human Nature*, Green and Grose edition, Vol. II, pp. 112, 142, 155, 179-80, 250-60; *Essays, Moral, Political and Literary*, Green and Grose edition, Vol. I, pp. 244 ff.

2. *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*; Cf. F. H. Giddings *Principles of Sociology*, Preface to the third edition.

3. *The Principles of a Positive Polity*, especially Vol. III, pp. 55 ff, 151 ff, 481-2. Cf. Levy-Bruhl, *The Philosophy of Comte*, pp. 322 ff.

4. *Study of Sociology*, Chap. XV; *Principles of Sociology*, Vol. I, Part I.

5. Cf. E. Barker, *Political Thought in England from Spencer to the Present Day*, Chap. vi.

6. F. W. Coker, *Organismic Theories of the State*, Chap. II.

7. *Problems of Life and Mind*; Cf. F. H. Giddings, *Principles of Sociology*, pp. 198-3, M. M. Davis, *op. cit.*, pp. 25-7.

8. *Der Mensch in der Geschichte*.

9. Davis, *op. cit.*, pp. 27-32, 42-44; T. Waitz, *Anthropologie der Naturvölker*; E. B. Tylor, *Primitive Culture*; W. Wundt, *Elements of Folk Psychology*; Ch. Letourneau, *La Psychologie ethnique*; D. G. Brinton, *The Basis of Social Relations*.

sociology.¹ The significance of evolutionary biology for psychology, individual and social, was established by genetic psychology in the hands of Granville Stanley Hall and James Mark Baldwin.² At the same time a group of important writers, such as Bagehot, Tarde, Sidis, Durkheim, Sighele, Le Bon, Sumner and Giddings, were developing the sociological bearings of such psychic factors as imitation, suggestion, fear, social constraint, custom and the consciousness of kind.³ While emphasizing different psychological forces they were at one in assaulting the intellectualism of the venerable Benthamite felicific calculus.⁴

The most important developments in social psychology during the first two decades of the present century have been the tendency towards a synthesis of the various specific doctrines which had emphasized some psychological force or process which is active in society, and the provision of new technique and modes of approach to psychological and sociological problems. The need for a more synthetic consideration of socio-psychological problems was set forth by Professor W. I. Thomas in his notable paper on *The Province of Social Psychology*, delivered before the Congress of Arts and Sciences at St. Louis in 1904. He emphasized the necessity of a pluralistic approach to the subject and of a consideration of the interaction of man and his social environment.⁵ Soon works began to appear which proved the soundness of his thesis. McDougall, Thorndike, Trotter and others carried further William James' preliminary generalizations concerning the socio-psychological significance of human instincts and the "original nature of man."

The results of their work were appropriated for sociology and social psychology by writers such as Graham Wallas, Edman and Lippmann. American psychological sociologists also made many important contributions to this synthetic tendency. Professor Giddings has broadened his psychology of society by weaving the doctrine of the "consciousness of kind" into a theory of social causation founded upon the doctrine of the differential response of organisms to stimulation which issues in "pluralistic behaviour." Professor Small has contributed a psycho-economic explanation of the social process resting upon the notion of the basic significance

1. L. F. Ward, *Psychic Factors of Civilization*; S. N. Patten, *A Theory of Social Forces*.

2. G. S. Hall, *Adolescence*, Vol. II, Chaps. x, xvi; J. M. Baldwin, *Mental Development in the Child and the Race*.

3. Davis, *op. cit.*; L. M. Bristol, *Social Adaptation*, Part III; Graham Wallas, *The Great Society*, Part I.

4. Cf. W. C. Mitchell, in *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 1914, pp. 1-42; and in *Political Science Quarterly*, June 1918, pp. 161-82; Graham Wallas, *Human Nature in Politics*.

5. *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. X, pp. 445-55.

of a number of vital human interests. Professor Cooley has presented an original synthesis which aims at a merging of individual and social psychology in the attempt to analyse the chief psychic factors in social organization and modern democratic society. Professor Ross has united an original adaptation of the theories of Tarde and other European social psychologists with his own penetrating observations on modern social processes in one of the most lucid and striking of the systems of psychological sociology. Professor Ellwood has prepared what is unquestionably the most reliable and comprehensive synthesis of the best and most up-to-date writings in the field of psychology and psychological sociology. Further, a number of writers, most notably Ward, Hobhouse, Wallas and Trotter, have shown that while one must admit the potency of instinctive and emotional factors in social behaviour, yet progress and constructive effort can come only from a social appreciation and appropriation of volitional and intellectual factors. New concepts and methods have been developed which contribute powerfully to an improvement of social psychology and psychological sociology. The experimental and statistical method, developed especially by Cattell and Thorndike, has provided a more perfect technique for gathering reliable data and testing results. Behaviouristic psychology is far more related to social psychology than the older introspective approach. Psycho-analysis has both provided a new set of mechanisms for exploring the mind of the individual and shown the social significance of the repression of normal human instincts. The introduction of fairly reliable methods of mental testing has revealed the existence of wide variations of mental capacity in even the so-called "normal" population which have sociological significance of the greatest import.¹ While it is now freely admitted that psychology is of the utmost value for the interpretation of political phenomena, few social psychologists or psychological sociologists have developed a coherent and comprehensive theory of the state. Rather, the contributions of this group of writers have thus far chiefly consisted in furnishing suggestive and indispensable prolegomena to the study of political phenomena and the formulation of sound political policy.

1. Among the more significant surveys of the development of social psychology and psychological sociology may be mentioned: M. M. Davis, *Psychological Interpretations of Society*, Chaps. i-v; John Dewey, "The Need for Social Psychology," in *The Psychological Review*, 1917, pp. 266 ff; Graham Wallas, *The Great Society*, Part I; L. M. Bristol, *Social Adaptation*, Part III; A. J. Todd, *Theories of Social Progress*, Part I; W. C. Mitchell, "Human Nature and Economics," in *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, Nov. 1914, pp. 1-47; J. P. Lichtenberger, "The Social Significance of Mental Levels," in *The Publications of the American Sociological Society*, Vol. XV, and the sections on "Social Psychology," in *The Psychological Bulletin*. An admirable syllabus of social psychology and psychological sociology, together with a classified bibliography, may be found in G. E. Howard's *Social Psychology, an Analytical Reference Syllabus*. For a discussion of the use of the terms social psychology and psychological sociology, see C. A. Ellwood, *Sociology in Its Psychological Aspects*, pp. 52-54.

2. PSYCHOLOGISTS WHO HAVE MADE IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE SOCIAL BEARINGS AND IMPLICATIONS OF THEIR SUBJECT.

A. *William James (1842-1910) and the Appearance of Systematic Psychology in the United States.* From the standpoint of chronological priority it is not an easy task to select the name which should head the list of psychologists who helped to shape social psychology in America. G. Stanley Hall, in his work on genetic psychology, or Lester F. Ward, in his attempt to adapt hedonism to psychological sociology, might contest with James the claim to precedence, but it has become customary to regard James as the founder in America of scientific psychology and the first to indicate its social implications. Of his position in the history of psychology Professor Woodworth has well said :—

Perhaps no one has better expressed in his writings the full scope and tendency of modern psychology than the late William James. He took as his background the older mental philosophy, especially of the English associationist school, being, however, keenly aware of its shortcomings and of certain necessary complements to be found in the mental philosophy of the Germans. Coming into psychology from the physiological laboratory, he retained the physiological point of view, was entirely hospitable to the new experimental psychology, and very early conducted experiments of his own. . . . His interest in the problems of genetic is seen in his specially excellent chapters on instinct and habit, and in the whole tenor of his work. With the French school of abnormal psychology he was keenly sympathetic, and he was able to find much of value in their works. All in all, he was evidently a good internationalist in his science, as indeed every good psychologist must be. Better than any other book, his great work on the *Principles of Psychology* can be taken as at once a summing up of the older psychology and an introduction to the modern point of view.¹

While James occupies no such pontifical position in the history of social psychology as in the field of the psychology of the individual, he made most important anticipations here, especially in his treatment of the "social self," habit and instincts. As Professor Dewey has said of this aspect of his contributions, "big books have been written since which are hardly more than an amplification of suggestions found in these few pages."² The work of McDougall and Thorndike on instincts and the original nature of man, of Trotter, Ross and Durkheim on the influence of the group over the individual, and of Sumner and others on the effect of socially acquired habits of thinking and action bear out Professor Dewey's statement.

In discussing the subject of habit, James summarizes his conclusions as to the psychology of the matter by quoting with approval Carpenter's generalization that "our nervous system grows to the modes in which it has been exercised."³ Among the most important practical applications of the psychology of habit are the fact that "habit simplifies the movements required to achieve a given result, makes them more accurate and diminishes

1. R. S. Woodworth, *Dynamic Psychology*, pp. 18-19.

2. J. Dewey, "The Need for Social Psychology," *Psychological Review*, 1917, p. 266.

3. Wm. James, *Principles of Psychology*, Vol. 1, p. 112.

fatigue," and that "habit diminishes the conscious attention with which our acts are performed."¹ The most important aspect of habit from the standpoint of sociology is its relation to the preservation of the social order.

Habit is the enormous fly-wheel of society, its most precious conservative agent. It alone is what keeps us all within the bounds of ordinance, and saves the children of fortune from the envious uprisings of the poor. It alone prevents the hardest and most repulsive walks of life from being deserted by those brought up to tread therein. It keeps the fisherman and deck-hand at sea through the winter; it holds the miner in his darkness, and nails the countryman to his log-cabin and his lonely farm through all the months of snow; it protects us from invasion by the natives of the desert and the frozen zone. It dooms us all to fight out the battle of life upon the lines of our nurture or early choice, and to make the best of a pursuit that disagrees, because there is no other for which we are fitted, and it is too late to begin again.²

The implications of the psychology of habit for political theory are obvious. It is both indispensable and detrimental. Political obedience, as insisted by Maine and the legalists, certainly rests to a large degree upon habit. Habit helps to make possible the existence of systematic and permanent political institutions, but it also facilitates the perpetuation of grossly ineffective, wasteful and anachronistic methods and practices. It makes it difficult for the vested interests to recognize the defects in their domination and for the poor to sense properly their oppression or to grasp its causes. It seriously challenges the Marxian theory of class-consciousness, for history and psychology have proved that the reactions of the masses are determined far more by their life experiences than by a rational comprehension of their interests, and that oppression is likely, within certain limits, to bring acquiescence rather than revolt. Further, it shows that though political parties may in the most fundamental sense be "interest-groups" their success and perpetuity rests chiefly upon the habitual and traditional allegiance of the masses to shibboleths and party names which are charged with the compelling psychological power of habitual response. In short, habit is the chief joy and bulwark of the conservative and despair of the radical and reformer.

In order properly to comprehend the psychology of habit one must examine the psychological nature and operation of instincts. An instinct, according to James, "is usually defined as the faculty of acting in such a way as to produce certain ends, without foresight of the ends, and without previous education in the performance."³ Among the more important special human instincts are imitation, emulation or rivalry, pugnacity, anger, resentment, sympathy, fear, approbation, acquisitiveness, construction, hunting, play, curiosity, sociability and shyness, modesty, shame, parental love and sexual

1. *Ibid.*, pp. 112-114.

2. *Ibid.*, pp. 120-21.

3. *Ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 283.

love.¹ The chief social significance of instincts is that they produce socially necessary habits, in fact, most habits are originated by instinctively impelled action.² As a gregarious animal man is excited by both the presence and absence of his kind. Therefore, the instincts are modified in their operation by their social setting, as well as being designed to fulfil some sort of social purpose.³ To point out the sociological and political significance of instinctive action is quite unnecessary in the light of the subsequent development of social psychology. Thorndike and McDougall have attempted to cover the whole field, and other writers have seen fit to devote systematic works to the consideration of the social operation of one or more important instincts. Perhaps the most important phase of the subject is that which has been cultivated by Graham Wallas in his analysis of the relation between human nature and politics and of the necessity of providing a social and political environment which will secure a proper stimulation of, and an adequate outlet for, the chief instinctive cravings of man.⁴

One of the most significant aspects of James' social psychology was his analysis of the "social self." Dividing the self into four phases or constituents—the material, social, spiritual and ego—he defines the social self as "the recognition which a man gets from his mates."⁵ The normal individual has a compelling desire to be noticed by his associates and to be regarded by them in a favourable manner. Therefore, each individual has as many social selves as there are distinct groups about whose opinion of him he has any concern.⁶ It is this influence of widely different groups of associates which accounts for the radical diversity of conduct and ethical standards of the individual when in the face of one or another of these groups. It is this which explains the remarkable propriety of the boy before his parents or the family clergyman, and his propensity to "swear like a pirate" when with his gang. It explains the existence of "honour among thieves." Fame and honour are products of the social self. Professional morality and honour depend almost wholly upon the type of conduct which is expected of an individual by his group. The influence of the forces flowing from the social self can alone explain why the individual who obeys nothing else will respect the code of honour of his club or profession.⁷

The significance of the basic notions of the "social self" for political theory can scarcely be exaggerated. They lay the

1. *Ibid.*, pp. 403 ff.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 402.

3. *Ibid.*, pp. 402, 430.

4. Graham Wallas, *Human Nature in Politics; The Great Society; Our Social Heritage*.

5. James, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 293-3.

6. *Ibid.*, p. 294.

7. *Ibid.*, pp. 294-6

foundation for a pluralistic view of society and the state as well as for a doctrine of personal conduct. They show that the individual will have as many loyalties as he has groups of associates and that his loyalty will be most intense towards that group with which he is most intimately and permanently associated. Further, they furnish the basis for the disconcerting query as to whether an individual can be loyal to a large national state or develop any high degree of "political" morality. The individual carries no image of the state in his mind and he has no strong sense of association with the mass of citizens who make up the state. His attitude towards the state is likely to be determined wholly by the stand taken by his associates with respect to political obedience and morality. The path is straight and direct from James' notion of the "social self" to the political theory of Léon Duguit, J. N. Figgis, G. D. H. Cole and H. J. Laski.¹

The problem of the relation of the individual to society, namely, social determinism, is considered by James in several of his essays. In that on "Great Men and their Environment" he makes a forceful plea for a comprehensive view of the problem, and sharply criticizes Herbert Spencer and Grant Allen for their defence of social and geographical determinism. He contends that both the notion that individual genius overrides his social environment and is independent of it, and the view that civilization is wholly shaped by general social or geographical conditions, are hopelessly incomplete and unscientific ways of looking at the question. The individual and society must each be assigned a proper weight. A few brief citations from this essay will summarize his well-balanced analysis of this basic problem in sociology and history:—

Our problem is, What are the causes that make communities change from generation to generation—that make the England of Queen Anne so different from the England of Elizabeth, the Harvard College of to-day so different from that of thirty years ago?

I shall reply to this problem, The difference is due to the accumulated influences of individuals, of their examples, their initiatives, and their decisions. The Spencerian school replies, The changes are irrespective of persons, and independent of individual control. They are due to the environment, to the circumstances, the physical geography, the ancestral conditions, the increasing experience of outer relations: to everything, in fact, except the Grants and Bismarcks, the Joneses and the Smiths. . . .

The causes of production of great men lie in a sphere wholly inaccessible to the social philosopher. He must simply accept geniuses as data, just as Darwin accepts his spontaneous variations. I affirm that the relation of the visible environment to the great man is in the main exactly what it is to the "variation" in the Darwinian philosophy. It chiefly adopts or rejects, preserves or destroys, in short selects him. And whenever it adopts and preserves the great man, it becomes modified by his influence in an original and peculiar way. He acts as a ferment, and changes its constitution, just as the advent of a new zoological species changes the faunal and floral equilibrium of the region in which it appears. . . .

The mutations of society, then, from generation to generation, are in the main due directly or indirectly to the acts or the example of individuals whose genius was so adapted to the receptivities of the moment, or whose accidental position of

1. Cf. H. J. Laski. *Studies in the Problem of Sovereignty* Chap. 1.

authority was so critical that they became ferments, initiators of movement, setters of precedent or fashion, centres of corruption, or destroyers of other persons, whose gifts, had they had free play, would have led society in another direction. . . .

But the indeterminism is not absolute. Not every 'man' fits every 'hour.' Some incompatibilities there are. A given genius may come either too early or too late. Peter the Hermit would now be sent to a lunatic asylum. John Mill in the tenth century would have lived and died unknown. Cromwell and Napoleon need their revolutions, Grant his civil war. An Ajax gets no fame in the day of telescopic-sighted rifles; and, to express differently an instance which Spencer uses, what could a Watt have effected in a tribe which no precursive genius had taught to smelt iron or to turn a lathe?

Thus social evolution is a resultant of the interaction of two wholly distinct factors,—the individual, deriving his peculiar gifts from the play of psychological and infra-social forces, but bearing all the power of initiative and origination in his hands; and, second, the social environment, with its power of adopting or rejecting both him and his gifts. Both factors are essential to change. The community stagnates without the impulse of the individual. The impulse dies away without the sympathy of the community. . . .

The evolutionary view of history, when it denies the vital importance of individual initiative, is, then, an utterly vague and unscientific conception, a lapse from modern scientific determinism into the most ancient oriental fatalism. The lesson of the analysis that we have made (even on the completely deterministic hypothesis with which we started) forms an appeal of the most stimulating sort to the energy of the individual. . . .

The plain truth is that the 'philosophy' of evolution (as distinguished from our special information about particular cases of change) is a metaphysical creed, and nothing else. It is a mood of contemplation, an emotional attitude, rather than a system of thought,—a mood which is old as the world, and which no refutation of any one incarnation of it (such as the Spencerian philosophy) will dispel; the mood of fatalistic pantheism, with its intuition of the One and All, which was, and is, and ever shall be, and from whose womb each single thing proceeds.¹

While James wrote this before the sociological school of historians had even partially reconstructed the synthesis of the past and attached rather more importance to the individual in history than is at present customary, his essay is a valuable corrective to either "hero-worship" or "social absolutism."

In his presidential address before the American Philosophical Society on "The Energies of Men," James made another important contribution to the subject of individual initiative, which, it would seem, rather tended in its implications towards emphasizing social limitations upon individual action and energy. The essence of his thesis is that "the human individual lives usually far within his limits; he possesses powers of various sorts which he habitually fails to use. He energises below his *maximum*, and he behaves below his *optimum*." Individuals utilise their real powers only when "some unusual stimulus fills them with emotional excitement, or some unusual idea of necessity induces them to make an extra effort of will."² While James did not offer many suggestions looking towards removing the cause of this serious defect in society he called attention to the problem. Some of the more evident explanations of this state of affairs have been contributed by the Freudian psychology with its theory of "repressions," and by Graham Wallas in his derived notion of "balked dispositions"

1. *The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy*, pp. 218, 228, 227, 229-30, 230, 245, 253.

2. *Memories and Studies*, pp. 229-64.

caused by a maladjustment between social institutions and customs and the native impulses of mankind.¹ It need not be emphasized that this waste of potential thought and energy in the social population is as serious a problem for the sociologist and statesman as the biological deterioration with which the eugenicist concerns himself.

James' important discussion of the problem of eliminating or reducing the frequency of wars in his "The Moral Equivalent of War" can be only briefly touched upon here. The set of facts to which he refers may, however, have quite as much bearing upon the whole problem of internationalism as the great volume of discussion and suggestions which have centred about the League of Nations. After a convincing demonstration of both the savagery and the deep-seated nature of the warlike impulses and sentiments in human nature, he concludes with the assertion that he does not "believe that peace either ought to be or will be permanent on this globe, unless the states pacifically organized preserve some of the old elements of army-discipline. . . . We must make new energies and hardihoods, continue the manliness to which the military mind so faithfully clings. Martial virtues must be the enduring cement; intrepidity, contempt of softness, surrender of private interest, obedience to command, must still remain the rock upon which states are built."² This essential condition could be met, James believed, by a social conscription of all young men to war against nature for a few years. They should be sent to "coal and iron mines, to freight trains, to fishing fleets in December, to dish-washing, clothes-washing, and window-washing, to road-building and tunnel-making, to foundries and stoke-holes, and to the frames of skyscrapers."³ This would not only be socially and economically productive, but would also "preserve in the midst of a pacific civilization the manly virtues which the military party is so afraid of seeing disappear in peace."⁴ In his "Remarks at the Peace Banquet" James advanced internationalist doctrine from another psychological standpoint by urging those interested in pacifism to

Organize in every conceivable way the practical machinery for making each successive chance of war abortive. Put peace men in power; educate editors and statesmen to responsibility. Seize every pretext, however small, for arbitration methods, and multiply precedents; foster rival excitements, and invent new outlets for heroic energy; and from one generation to another the chances are that irritation will grow less acute and states of strain less dangerous among the nations.⁵

In his theories respecting state-activity James was by training

1. Cf. S. Freud, *A General Introduction to Psychoanalysis*; Graham Wallas, *The Great Society*, Part I.

2. *Memories and Studies*, pp. 287-88.

3. *Ibid.*, pp. 290-91.

4. *Ibid.*, p. 291.

5. *Ibid.*, pp. 305-6.

and preference an advocate of individualism and *laissez-faire*, but was acute enough to realize that social and economic conditions had sharply modified the applicability of the views of the classical economists. While about the only whole-hearted praise he ever bestowed upon Herbert Spencer was his eulogy of Spencer's individualism, he became, like John Stuart Mill, at least partially reconciled to the probable development of a progressively greater amount of state-activity.¹

B. Granville Stanley Hall (1846-) and *Genetic Psychology*. It has become well-nigh a platitude that Darwinism was the most important discovery of the nineteenth century, and adequate recognition of this fact has been made by social scientists in various fields. To the task of linking up psychology with Darwinism and indicating the bearing of the evolutionary hypothesis upon the mental development and traits of mankind no other writer has made a contribution in any way approaching the work of G. Stanley Hall in formulating his body of "genetic psychology."²

Hall's training was almost unique. He was the first American really to get into touch with the remarkable advances in German psychology and the other branches of science and philosophy auxiliary to it. The names of some of his teachers, Pfleiderer, Paulsen, Virchow, Bastian, Dubois-Reymond, Helmholtz, Ludwig, Fleischig, Czermak, Fechner and Wundt, are sufficient to indicate the breadth and excellence of his training. Further than being the founder of genetic psychology, Hall was the first to introduce modern experimental psychology into this country and the first academic psychologist to sanction Freudian psychology.³

The fundamental doctrines of genetic psychology may be summarized in the following manner: The developmental point of view must be assumed at the outset. It is essential to recognize that the mind, as well as, and along with, the body, has evolved through the selective process in the course of an almost boundless era of time. Hence, attention should chiefly be centred on the problem of mental evolution. Much data can be obtained through a study of the mental life of primitive peoples, but this may be supplemented by an examination of the mental development of the individual, for, by the "law of recapitulation," the individual reproduces in his psychic growth the chief stages and characteristics

1. *Memories and Studies*, pp. 140-41. James says of Spencer on this point: "Spencer's politico-ethical activity in general breathes the purest English spirit of liberty, and his attacks on over-administration and criticisms on the inferiority of great centralized systems are worthy to be the text-books of individualists the world over. I confess that it is with this part of his work, in spite of his harshness and inflexibility of tone that I sympathize most."

2. Much biographical material of scientific as well as personal interest may be obtained in L. N. Wilson's *G. Stanley Hall, a Sketch*, 1914. The period of his education is covered in pages 25-71. In his *Makers of Modern Psychology*, he describes many of his teachers.

3. It is significant that it was under Hall's guidance that nearly every phase of modern psychological progress made its entry into this country.

in the mental evolution of the race. Psychologically, as well as biologically, "ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny." The practical application of these doctrines by Hall and his disciples has been chiefly in the field of child study, the scientific beginning of which may be traced back to three articles contributed in 1882-3 on "The Moral and Religious Training of Children," "The Contents of Children's Minds on Entering School," and "The Study of Children."¹

The following selected and arranged citations from Partridge's epitome of Hall's psychological method and approach will suffice to indicate the most significant of his theoretical positions:—

The ideal of the new psychology, based upon the dictum, *No psychosis without neurosis*, has been to discover for each mental state and process an equivalent or correlate in the body or in nature. This is the main problem of physiological psychology, of psycho-physics, and of the experimental methods generally. The point of view is good, so far as it goes, but it is still a narrow conception of the province of a science of mind. A far more fruitful method is opened to it by the principle introduced into biology by Charles Darwin. Not only does it reveal a programme of more important and far-reaching work than the study in the laboratory, but it suggests the means of a truer interpretation of all the facts. Such a science is entitled to the name of *Biological Philosophy*; for it extends its problems from the study of the merely individual mental processes of the adult, to the study of all mind, past, present, and future, in whatever form it appears; and its interpretation passes from the physiological explanation of mental states to the biological.

The fundamental fact and principle of this biological philosophy is that mind and body have evolved together in the race, and have developed together in the individual, in one continuous process. Not only, therefore, must all mental facts be understood in terms of, or with reference to, physical facts, but the individual, both in his mental and physical aspects, must be studied in relation to the whole history of the race. This evolutionary principle must be applied to all problems of psychology, until we have a complete natural history of the mind. . . .

This new method and problem in psychology, taken in its widest sense, may be called the genetic. It aims to explain whatever process or state it observes by tracing it, in all its connections, to its origin. To understand any trait of the human mind, for example, it is necessary to discover not only the relation of the mental process to the changes in the nervous system upon which it depends, and to analyse the process into its elements, but we must know the genesis of the trait in the individual, both in its physical and its mental manifestations and connections, and also the whole history of it as it appears in the race. This is an ideal not to be attained in any problem at the present time, but it must constantly be striven toward in every investigation of the facts of human life. The genetic method has, therefore, two main branches: the study of mind in its development in the child, and the study of mind in its evolution in the race. No problem can be regarded as deeply understood that does not take into account both these aspects. . . .

Genetic psychology assumes as an ultimate fact, and as a background for all its principles, an endless process of time, stretching out into an infinitely remote past and pointing towards an infinitely remote future. Every thing, and every event, must be regarded as the completion of an infinitely long process of development, in terms of which it can be explained; and also as germinal of a future, of which it is in turn to be the cause or genetic origin. Development and change are continuous and unbroken. Nothing is stationary, and man himself is in a stage of active evolution toward a higher form. . . .

The mind stretches far beyond the limited experiences of the individual. It contains within itself all the past and all the future. It has grown up in the race,

1. Cf. especially *Adolescence*, 2 Vols., 1904, preface, and Vol. II, Chaps. x, xv, xvi. This book in its field and in its influence may be compared to James' *Principles of Psychology*. A complete bibliography of his published works to 1914 is contained in Wilson, *op. cit.*, pp. 118 ff. The most convenient place in which to find a comprehensive statement of Hall's psychological and pedagogical principles is in G. E. Partridge's *The Genetic Philosophy of Education*, 1912, a faithful synthesis and compilation of all of Hall's major doctrines. It was authorized and approved by Hall. For an excellent brief summary of Hall's leading principles see the *American Anthropologist*, 1904, pp. 589-91. Hall's own epitome of his *Adolescence* appeared in 1906 under the title *Youth, its Education, Regimen and Hygiene*.

step by step, and has passed through stages as different from its present form as we can possibly conceive. It is so vastly complex that it is never twice alike in the same individual, nor are ever two minds the same. It is a product of millions of years of struggle. Its long experience with light and darkness, and with heat and cold, have established many of its rhythms. A long apprenticeship in aquatic and arboreal life has left deep and indelible marks. Sky, wind, storm, flowers, animals, ancient industries and occupations, have directed its fears and affections, and have made the emotions what they now are. It has been shocked and moulded into its present form by labour and suffering, and it shows in every function the marks of the process through which it has passed. Although it is by far the most wonderful work of nature it is still very imperfect, full of scars and wounds, incompletely co-ordinated, and but poorly controlled; in many ways ill-adapted to the practical situations of life. In it barbaric and animal impulses are still felt. Its old forms appear at every turn; and every trait of mind, as well as of body, is full of indications of its origin. So close, indeed, is the past to the present in all we think and feel, that without referring to what has gone before in the race, the human mind, as we know it, is utterly unintelligible and mysterious; while many, if not most, of its mysteries become clear, when the mind is studied with reference to its past.

This point of view is essential for any introduction into the science of psychology. Only thus may one grasp the significance of mind in the world, and be prepared to interpret the common facts of everyday life. One must see that only by studying mind objectively, in its racial manifestations, and in many individuals, can any conception of its range, depth, and meaning be attained. An individual mind is but an infinitesimal fragment and expression of all the soul life in the world. . . .

Such is the conception of man that results from the work of Darwin. His mind is to be regarded as quite as much an offspring of animal life as is his body. The same principles may be applied to both, and both must be investigated by similar inductive methods. . . .

Thus far we have considered the mind and body with respect to their nature and contents. It is quite as important to understand them in what may be called their dynamic aspects, with reference to their development, both in the individual and the race, and to the relation of the two series, the ontogenetic and the phylogenetic, to one another. The discovery of the laws of development is one of the chief aims of genetic science, and in our practical science of man, we are most of all concerned with such principles. The most general formulation of all the facts of development that we yet possess is contained in the *law of recapitulation*. This law declares that the individual, in his development, passes through stages similar to those through which the race has passed, and in the same order; that the human individual of the higher races, for example, in the brief period from the earliest moment of life to maturity, passes through or represents all the stages of life, through which the race has passed from that of the single-celled animal to that of present adult civilized man. The recapitulatory process is sometimes obscured; stages overlap, or become dissociated; the individual must sometimes recount thousands of years of his racial history in a day or year; environment complicates and modifies the process in ways still quite unknown; but in a general way the individual may be said to recapitulate the race.¹

The bearing of the general thesis of genetic psychology upon politics is readily discernible. It furnishes a scientific basis for the generalizations of writers on political theory from Polybius to Hume and the present day, who have held that the state, government and the habits of obedience which accompany them were not "made," but developed gradually along with the progress of the culture of the race. The habits of political obedience and associated practices and institutions go back for their origins to the limitations imposed upon early appearing organisms by the physical environment, to the disciplining of the young of animals, to the control of animal behaviour by the herd, to the domination of primitive man by the strong, wise and wily, and to the gradual evolution of obedience to

1. Partridge, *op. cit.*, pp. 14-38. Cf. J. M. Baldwin, *History of Psychology*, Vol. II, pp. 94-98.

formal political institutions which have themselves evolved along with the generations which have shaped them and adapted them to their needs and services. A psychical foundation is thus provided for a truly "natural history of the state." Further ethnographic and historical evidence as to the origins of political institutions may be supplemented by observing the genesis of obedience in the individual.

In a paper on "The Social Phases of Psychology," read at the annual meeting of the *American Sociological Society* in 1912, Hall indicated the major points of common interest between genetic psychology and sociology. Both are interested in the analysis of animal and insect societies as an introduction to a study of human society. Both are concerned with child-study, for the social phases of the development of children recapitulate the progress of social life in primitive society. Both must consider anthropology and folk-psychology as throwing light upon the evolution of mentality and social life. Both must deal with the psychology of imitation, for it is a basic factor in both education and socialization. Both regard crime as anti-social action and as the product of an abnormal personality. Finally, both look upon justice as "the cardinal virtue of the social man," and recognize the validity of a broadly conceived identification of pleasure and duty and of sin and suffering.¹

In one of his most recent works, *Morale, the Supreme Standard of Life and Conduct*, he has applied his psychology, which by this time had come to embrace a modified Freudianism, to a study of the leading problems of war and peace. As the work is itself primarily an encyclopædic survey of doctrines, space does not allow a detailed examination of its contents, but it is essential to make clear his view of the nature of morale and its function in individual and social life. The following paragraph epitomizes his thesis:—

Is there any chief end of man, any goal or destiny supreme over all others? If so, and if found, we shall have in the degree of approximation to it the best of all scales on which to measure real progress in terms of which all human values are best stated and defined. I answer that there is such a goal and that it took the awful psychic earthquake of war to reveal it in its true perspective and to show us its real scope. It is simply this—to keep ourselves, body and soul, and our environment, physical, social, industrial, etc., always at the very tip-top of condition. This super-hygiene is best designated as Morale. It implies the maximum of vitality, life abounding, getting and keeping in the very centre of the current of creative evolution; and minimizing, destroying, or avoiding all checks, arrests and inhibitions to it. This mysterious developmental urge, entelechy, will-to-live, *élan vital*, *horme*, libido, *nisus*, or by whatever name it is called, which made all the ascending orders of life and in Man-soul itself evolved mind, society, language, myths, industry, gods, religion—in short, all human institutions, and, lastly, science, is in some strong, in others weak, and in the same individual it is now high, now low; but its presence makes and absence destroys, morale. The story of the retardations and advancements of this great energy in the cosmos constitutes every kind of real history. It is the only truly divine power that ever was or will be. Hence it follows that morale thus conceived is the one and only true religion of the present and the

1. *Publications of the American Sociological Society*, 1912, pp. 38 ff.

future, and its doctrines are the only true theology. Every individual situation and institution, every race, nation, class, or group is best graded as ascendant or decadent by its morale.¹

On the basis of this view of the nature and significance of morale Hall analyses the problems of war morale on the field of battle and among the civilian population. This section of the work is an important resumé of a field which has been little cultivated in the literature of war psychology and statesmanship.² He then examines the bearing of this conception of morale upon contemporary economic and social problems, such as labour, prohibition, profiteering, feminism, education, statesmanship, radicalism and religion. Especially significant is the chapter on morale and statesmanship, in which he points out the general domination of mediocrity in modern political society, the hopelessness of the rule of mediocrity in the time of a great crisis, and the difficulty which even great leaders have in rising to the demands produced by such an event as the World War and its after-problems.³ As far as his work adequately deals with the subjects he has set himself to examine it constitutes an important approach to the problem which James has outlined in his "Energies of Men" and which Wallas calls attention to in his theory of "balked dispositions" and his analysis of the organization of concerted social effort. Notable is Hall's acknowledgment of the necessity of recognizing the subconscious factors which affect morale, individual and social.

1. G. S. Hall, *op. cit.*, pp. 1-2.

2. *Ibid.*, pp. 22-266.

3. *Ibid.*, pp. 293-315.

(To be continued.)

INTERNATIONAL SOCIOLOGICAL CONGRESS.

The Institut de Sociologie (Turin), of which Mr. A. J. Balfour, Mr. V. Branford, Mr. S. H. Swinny, and Professor Westermarck are honorary members, proposes to hold in Turin, October 9-16, an International Sociological Congress. The subjects suggested for discussion are various aspects of international relations, the League of Nations, the protection of national minorities, colonial mandates, the international organization of commerce, industry, and labour, etc. The fee (50 francs), includes a copy of the proceedings of the Congress, and should be forwarded to Prof. Francesco Cosentini, Via Santorre Santarosa 21, Turin, Italy, who will supply any further information required.

THE SUBJECT INDEX TO PERIODICALS, 1917-1919. B-E, Historical, Political and Economic Sciences. Issued by the Library Association, pp. 495. London, 1921. £1 1s. net. (Agents: King and Son.)

This is a useful publication, which will be of great value to students of the social sciences who wish to trace a subject through the periodical literature of our times. It is compiled on a largeminded and comprehensive plan, and in arrangement, printing, and general style seems to follow good English traditions. A sociologist will naturally feel inclined to raise questions about classification, subject headings, and cross references: it would, however, be unfair to suggest that this subject-index is in any way below the average of English cataloguing practice in these respects.

RURAL FINANCE.

FROM the point of view of return on Capital, Landowning is no longer a business proposition, and but for the compensations of sport and a country life, the investment would not be made. Unfortunately these two compensations have to a large extent come to be regarded as the dominating interest of landowning. The depression of agriculture in the eighties also led to a farming policy based on minimum expenditure of capital—hence the extension of grass land over arable. The consequence is that the average landowner receives a certain rent and other advantages and devotes a minimum of attention to the business of agriculture (such attention being given mainly through agents); the average farmer expends on the land the minimum in manures, in wages and in resource, and generally seeks to extract a maximum in return for this minimum expenditure of capital and trouble; the labourer is badly paid and worse housed, having neither the opportunity nor the means of bettering his position unless by abandoning the land, since the very nature of the system has tended to the employment of the minimum number.

This attitude towards the capitalization of Agriculture is reflected in the attitude of the Banks, which quite properly fear to lock up money in land, and can hardly be expected to have more confidence in placing capital in the business of Agriculture than those who are carrying it on.

At the same time there is no doubt that more capital is required and can be utilized by landowners. Capital for draining is badly needed in some places: for building; for tree planting; and for a variety of other uses varying with the circumstances. But to render this investment of capital productive, there must be a thorough system of scientific use and management and re-organization of the whole of agricultural life.

Generally speaking, the men who have reached the position of holding large farms are in that position either in virtue of possessing all their requirements of capital, or being in that position can readily command them. There are, however, cases in which the large farmer, ostensibly in a prosperous position, in reality has been so heavily indebted from the start that on a realization his estate shows no surplus. These men are usually 'tied' to some auctioneer or seed merchant and have been systematically bled.

Owing to the high prices which have been current during the War the position of farmers generally throughout the country has,

however, been one of unexampled prosperity. Many are known to have made considerable fortunes, and there has been much purchasing of farms, often at absurdly enhanced prices. There does not, however, appear to be much, if any, evidence that the money is being applied to improvements in agriculture. This period of high prices and a guaranteed minimum for wheat may, in the long run, have a demoralizing effect so far as the efficiency of farming is concerned, since it will tend to check all endeavours towards improved methods and a higher productivity, and farmers are already notoriously backward and slow in this respect.

The small-holder is less favourably situated in regard to capital than the larger farmer. His access to banking assistance is much more restricted, partly on account of the atmosphere of doubt created in the minds of business people as to the financial soundness of the small-holding idea. This doubt is not unnatural, and may be traced partly to the fact that the subject has been too much at the mercy of the political prepossessions of one party or the other; that at the beginning of the movement there was in many cases insufficient care shown in the choice of men, with unsatisfactory consequences; and that all the conditions of successful small-holding are so far not yet fully understood. Bankers are in consequence doubtful of dealing with these small men, whose consciousness of the comparative insignificance of their affairs, added to their natural secretiveness, further handicaps them in approaching the banker. In the great majority of cases these men capitalize themselves by slow and painful saving. To such men, drawn from the best of the labourers of the country, sound opportunities of credit would be an inestimable advantage. It is in this class that the need is greatest and that the satisfying of that need is most vital to the nation.

Not only would credit of the right sort save many a man from disaster, but it would serve to shorten the period of his probation and employ his powers to the full whilst he is in the prime of life. Many spend the best working years of their lives in the slow and toilsome process of "getting a start." With credit well applied the process could be speeded-up, and with incalculable results.

In many parts of the country these men finance themselves by means of auxiliary occupation, both in purely agricultural and also in industrial—generally mining—districts. This fact is one of the greatest significance as pointing a way in which credit may be supplemented and a labouring population assisted, and forms one of many arguments in favour of the development of village industries. That is to say, the organizing of a market or an outlet is vital not only for products but for labour also.

Condemnation of the attitude of the banks towards agriculture

is almost universal. The general grounds of complaint are the indifference of the banks to the interests and the needs of agriculture; their unsympathetic treatment of individual cases: a tendency to deal with agricultural loans on a basis which, while possibly suitable for trade conditions, takes little or no account of the seasonal and other peculiarities of agriculture: and the unfavourable or expensive terms required. This state of things is most commonly attributed to the disappearance of the old country banker and his absorption by the joint-stock banks, who have substituted local agents who in effect have only very limited discretion in regard to advances without reference to the head office in London, and whilst styled "Managers" are in effect little more than bank-officials.

What is true of these agents is also broadly true of the banks themselves. Their prepossession is in favour of trading business, or "high finance," and the farmers' concerns are in every respect secondary. In many quite small country towns one cannot fail to be struck by the numerous banking branches, sometimes running to half a dozen, all with modern, well-equipped offices, and the question naturally arises, from what form of business do they draw the profits which justify this competitive expenditure? By universal consent it is not from the volume of rural lending! These branches exist primarily as deposit agencies, which collect the local deposits and export them to the manufacturing towns or to London.

Yet the banking record of the farmer as borrower is on the whole favourable, the percentage of loss it is said being very low in dealings with him. The banker's experience is, however, apt to be limited to the large farmer, so-called. As to what is a large farmer, the definition varies throughout the country, a farm of 200—400 acres being considered "large" in some areas, whilst no farm under 1,000 acres would be so considered in other districts. According to the Board of Agriculture Returns for 1915 barely 3½ per cent. of the total number of agricultural holdings in England and Wales were of 300 acres or over—these holdings representing 25 per cent. of the available acreage. On the other hand, 67 per cent. of the total number of holdings (16 per cent. of the acreage) were holdings of from 1 to 50 acres only.

It is true these returns do not show how many individuals are represented, but allowing for a certain percentage of cases where more than one holding is in the hands of one man, the great preponderance of the small men is fully established. The small men are certainly not those for whom the banks are disposed to cater. Amongst this limited class from whom they have requests for credit the banks meet these requests fairly, *where the men they are dealing*

with are in a position to comply with their demands; but what may be a perfectly simple matter to a man in an assured position may prove an insuperable obstacle to a man in a less favoured position, and when the terms and conditions are entirely unsuited to the borrower's position and condition.

Long credit from tradesmen, dealers, auctioneers, and seedsmen is the commonest of all the modes of capitalization. There are extreme cases of men who have carried the practice to such an extent that they are practically without capital of their own, and deliberately finance themselves by running up bills with all the firms with whom they deal. An inevitable accompaniment of this is the occurrence of bad debts, with all the demoralizing consequences which follow. From one point of view, however, these tradesmen may be looked upon as benefactors of the agricultural community, and where the terms of their credit have been reasonable this is undoubtedly the case, as they have supplemented the deficiencies of the joint-stock banking systems, and have acted as intermediaries generally between the banks and the general population in the distribution of credit. Even where their terms of business have been exacting, or even harmful, they have performed a function which the banks have failed to assume. Necessarily this has arisen because, as one of the very conditions of their business, they acquire a knowledge of their customers far more intimate than is possible for the Banks, and are thus able to deal with the granting of credit where the banks have neither the information nor the means for doing so. Not that the dispensing of credit, as it has been worked and is worked by these men, is in any sense satisfactory. It is far removed from that, but they have in a sense performed the credit function, and in their experience and in many of their methods, we can find an invaluable guide to a sound solution of the problem. It must always be kept in mind that the fundamental objective and use of all credit is to facilitate the exchange of goods and services, and that its distribution can scarcely too closely coincide with that exchange, since its repayment depends on the results.

The failure of the joint-stock banks to meet the needs of all classes is mainly due, then, to their too great dissociation from this practical business of exchange. They have left the regulation of this to merchants and traders, amongst whom quite naturally and necessarily, systems of credit, totally unregulated and often undesirable, have grown up.

In the agricultural co-operative trading associations, however, we have already in existence the actual concrete business for which a regulated credit system may be devised and to which it can be fitted.

Undesirable features of tradesmen's credit, which are to be found pretty widely, are : (a) high prices with poor quality of goods, sometimes also (b) short delivery of goods, the farmer having no means of weighing. Where the farmer is already indebted he is helpless to protest against any of these practices, knowing that his protest will be met with an instant demand for payment of what is owing. The worst feature of this kind of credit, however, is (c) where it is granted in consideration that the farmer shall sell his produce or his crop to the tradesman, seedsman or other. Such transactions are not necessarily undesirable, but open the way to abuse in their present unregulated condition. The price at which produce, etc., is taken in exchange is often fixed entirely by the tradesman in his own interest, and if the farmer dares to protest, which he is as a rule afraid to do, he is promptly called upon to pay his debt. In theory the interest on the advance is supposed to be included in the price charged for the seeds and fertilizers, but apart from interest the price is frequently in excess of market rate. The price given for the produce is lower than the market rate, ostensibly on account of the supposed advantage to the farmer in finding him a market for his crop in advance. In reality he has no choice of market, and the reduction of price is actually a second interest charge for the original advance. He thus pays in three ways for the advance, or, supposing the quality of the seeds and fertilizers to be deficient, and the quantity short weight, as is often the case, in no less than five different ways! Men in this position are "tied," and it is difficult to say whether these conditions of business or the operations of the ordinary moneylender are more really harmful to prosperity amongst the agricultural classes.

There is another aspect of this diversion of profits into unproductive channels. Where the rates of wages are low, an insufficient wage means lessened power of production from every point of view, and leads to debt, even if it does not involve undesirable and ruinous borrowing. Inevitably someone has to pay for these debts, and consequently they form an element in every price. Bad debts, which figure as an item in every balance sheet, are thus an index of waste or friction in the economic machine. The claim that increased wages will mean increased prices, though obviously true, forgets to state that poor wages may mean increased prices too, and altogether ignores the almost incalculable effect of the greater efficiency and higher productive power which an adequate wage may bring. Nor is this all, for the reduction of the waste and friction of bad debts means a saving not lightly to be ignored.

One of the most difficult questions to be dealt with in financing agriculture is the question of security.

The general opinion, as stated above, is that, taken as a class,

the farmer is a safe man to lend to, and that with a man of good character formal security is not indispensable. Where material security and guarantees by third parties are demanded they may be regarded as supplementary, therefore, to character security, either because the borrower's character gives insufficient confidence, or that the banker's knowledge of him, or ability or willingness to keep in sympathetic touch with him and his fortunes, is deficient. A good credit system will, therefore, aim at supplementing these deficiencies on the part of both lender and borrower. There will always remain, however, certain contingencies independent of these which must be provided against—such contingencies are sudden and unforeseen calamity, as bad harvests, damage by floods, or losses by epidemics, and security against these forms of loss must be found in one or other of the many forms of insurance.

The principal feature of tradesmen's credit is, however, that it is granted by the advance, not of money, but of goods of one kind or another for a longer or shorter period, and *without written security or documentary formalities of any sort*. The tradesman "sells" his goods to the purchaser on terms as to payment, or at such a price, as allows for interest up to the date of settlement. The extra risks which he runs through absence of formal security where this would be required in the case of a cash advance, and also the difficulties attendant on realisation in the event of legal proceedings becoming necessary, are also presumably taken account of in the price. Now if the tradesman can dispense with security, why not the banker? Whatever the cause, the fact of the absence of formality and that it can be dispensed with so largely, is the vital point of concern, and offers the clue to a more easily workable credit system, viz., that by making advances in tangible form, i.e.—of the necessary requirements for which credit is asked, and through the agricultural co-operative trading societies—the real needs of borrowers of this type can be met with far more effectiveness and much more widely.

The relation of the type of farming to credit requirements affords a line of study which should be of great value in the financing of agriculture. The difference in the financial needs of a wheat or corn-growing farm and of a dairy farm is the most marked instance of this. A farmer who is growing wheat or other corn crops mainly has to face expenditure for seed, manures, and labour in the spring, and throughout the summer and autumn is practically without any income from the farm from which to meet these expenditures. This is one of the chief difficulties of the farmer of this type: his lack of adequate credit not only to meet these expenses, but also to prevent his having to throw his crops on the market at a time when prices are low. It actually happens that prices are depressed

immediately after harvest as a result of this necessity on the part of many farmers.

In marked contrast is the case of the farmer who engages in dairy farming. He has expenditure for feeding-stuffs and labour, but against this he receives from the sale of milk a regular weekly or monthly cheque. Consequently he does not suffer from a shortage of cash with which to meet his requirements, and his finances show no such extreme depletion as those of the farmer growing corn only.

Whilst the dairy farmer has a constant supply of saleable produce for which there is a practically continuous consumption throughout the year (not keeping absolute pace, it is true), the corn-growing farmer has little or no saleable produce except at one season, when the entire produce of the farm becomes available for sale. In his case production is concentrated, as it were, at one moment, but the consumption of this is spread over, and is continuous during the whole year. The corn-growing farmer may either hold his produce himself and dispose of it in quantities as demand arises, or he may dispose of it in bulk to some intermediary, who in turn dispenses it as it can be absorbed by the market. The importance of this function, whether performed by the farmer or by the middleman, is insufficiently realized. On the one hand, it is intimately related to the steadying of prices, and on the other to the stabilizing of the farmer. This is a function which has to be undertaken to a far larger extent by the agricultural co-operative trading societies. In organizing this (which involves finance for them) they would at the same time take a considerable step towards financing the farmer and removing the financial extremes from which he suffers. By the further step of co-ordinating all these societies and their work in this direction, the organized control of all supplies and their distribution could be arrived at, with a consequent steadying of prices both to producer and to consumer.

But this comparison of a corn-growing farm and a dairy farm, whilst thus suggestive of an organization of market and credit to meet the needs of the farmer, is also suggestive of a possible organization of the farm itself so as to secure from it a steady flow of saleable produce throughout the year. There are, in fact, other ways in which the farmer may finance himself than by borrowing, and it is plain that the farmer who combines wheat-growing and milk-producing on his farm would be finding an outlet for produce, with a corresponding income, and to that extent relieving the strain upon his resources while his corn is ripening. It is similarly evident that other crops or produce may be grown, so adjusted in their succession and to the needs of the market, as to supply a regular flow of produce saleable or usable, with a corre-

spending income bridging the gap between autumn crop and autumn crop. To work out such systems is to reduce credit requirements to the minimum by a "balanced economics" of the farm.

Already such systems of 'continuous cropping' or 'soiling' are in use. Along with this it is essential that a market be found or organized, for from one point of view the problem of financing the farmer is the problem of finding him a market, of finding him a continuous income and so shortening the gaps between output and return.

In a precisely similar way the problem of financing the farm labourer may be looked at as a question of organizing for him a full market for his labour. The occupations of the farm are subject, according to the type of farming, to more or less violent extremes of employment and unemployment, and without entering on a discussion of the question of agricultural wages, it is quite safe to say that this fluctuation has its share in determining the rate of these wages. While we may, on the one hand, assume that this rate will tend to be an economic rate from the point of view of the particular type of farming, it would not follow that the raising of that wage to be an economic one from the standpoint of the labourer is an impossibility. That is to say the wage may be precisely what the particular occupation can economically pay, and may also be duly proportioned to the labour which it requires and employs, but may be wholly inadequate from the standpoint of the labourer, from the fact that the occupation restricts his market or affords him only a very partial market for the labour he has to sell.

There are various directions in which a market for the farm labourer may be organized. First of all, by the re-organization of the farm itself so as to carry the maximum of labour and to employ it as far as possible throughout the year. That this involves increased expenditure in the first place is obvious, and involves also providing the means by which the farmer can capitalize himself to that end. But the life and occupations of the farm no more cover the whole of the activities of a district than the farm itself. Thus the reorganization has to be planned, not of individual or detached farms merely, but in relation to some larger unit, which should be determined by geographical, physical, and other considerations, and in relation also to existing estate divisions, arbitrary though these may often be. Such divisions will include the varied characteristics and conditions which determine the life of the resident community as a whole, and thus an economy not of the farm merely, but of the area or estate, may be worked out in each case.

To establish the credit of the labourer by finding him a market

for his labour thus necessitates a wider view than the organization of the farm, which even at best may not absorb all his energies, and suggests an organized co-ordination of the whole activities of the community—a bringing of its whole available energies into touch with the work required to be done, as well as the organizing of fresh outlets for those energies.

Herein lies one of the principal benefits of the organization of rural industries of all kinds, that from the economic standpoint they provide an outlet for surplus energies and in return a surplus income.

It is suggested then that not only has the business of the individual farm to be re-organized, but that each region with its activities must be re-organized and developed as a whole.

This necessitates an exhaustive survey of the resources of each region and also of its possibilities.

Further, a complete organization for marketing and disposal of output is essential. These tasks could be undertaken through the agency of local co-operative trading societies in each region, and should be co-ordinated in a central body, which would deal with the purchase of requirements in bulk for the local groups, and also with the disposal of their output; also acting as intermediary between different localities.

Financial and credit requirements should be supplied by the local societies so far as possible in the form of the goods desired to be purchased with the credit asked for. Their own resulting credit requirements would be similarly supplied in the form of goods by the central body, which should, it is suggested, in its turn obtain this 'bulk' credit by an arrangement with the Joint Stock Banks.

To summarize then, the development of rural finance is dependent on—

- (a) a re-organization of farming so as to secure greater variety and continuity of product throughout the year;
- (b) the development of supplementary occupations and rural industries;
- (c) the organization of a complete system for the supply of requirements and the exchange and disposal of output;
- (d) and finally all this involves not only a thorough survey of localities, but also, and not least, provision for education in the widest sense.

JOHN ROSS.

REVIEWS.

THE CONCLUSIONS OF SOCIOLOGY.

PHILOSOPHIE DES SCIENCES SOCIALE. III. *Conclusions des Sciences Sociales.* Par René Worms. 2nd Edition revised. Paris: Marcel Giard et Cie. 10 francs.

M. Worms, in the excellent work before us, speaks of the rapid increase of the social sciences and their possible transformation in the near future. I am very far from taking so optimistic a view of their situation. In the last thirty years what really original discoveries have been made? What is there that would mark an epoch or even make a single year memorable? If we except the works of M. de Tourville, and M. Demolins, of the school of Leplay, what have the sociologists done save to heap up masses of undigested facts and make trivial criticisms on the great masters of the nineteenth century? But the more M. Worms is mistaken in his favourable diagnosis, the more valuable is his labour in bringing order out of chaos, and giving their just due to the founders of the science. He himself always keeps a well-balanced judgment, as he shows in his attitude to Marx's materialist theory of history; while he believes that the initial and dominating part in sociology belongs to intellectual discovery, he does not ignore the material basis on which it rests. A true synthesis must find place for both elements. He avoids, too, the theory—really biological—of a hierarchy of races, lately so popular. Races are modified by their environment, by their contacts, by their share in the general human heritage. Not one is condemned by fate to a perpetual inferiority. It may almost be said to-day that "ideas make the race." He rejects the theory—too simple for the facts—that progress takes place in a straight line, while he does not fall into the error of Saint-Simon in supposing humanity to pass through alternating periods, organic and critical, a theory not without its partial truth when subordinated as it was by Comte to the continuity of Man's intellectual evolution. M. Worms is less happy when he suggests the similitude of a bundle of lines, each representing some side of the general advance and each having its own direction. The various aspects of social life are closely connected and dependent. Perhaps the best similitude of all—though all are dangerous if pushed too far—is that suggested, I believe, by Madame de Staël, the spiral or helix. Mankind, crawling up the thread of the screw, follows the direction of the axis, but with divagations now on one side, now on the other; and perhaps, since sociology is not mathematics, the thread does not always keep at the same distance from the axis, and the axis is sometimes bent.

Dividing his subject into three parts—the Social Elements, Social Life, and Social Evolution—he does full justice to his great predecessors, especially Comte and Spencer, whose law of the passage from homogeneous confusion to heterogeneous co-ordination, he considers when taken with due reservations the greatest discovery in Sociology since Comte's Law of the Three States. The Law of the Three States is itself in his view open to challenge in one particular. Before the Theological State, there is a pre-historic period in which the mind of Man far from attempting to explain the world—is entirely dominated by his surroundings. Therefore, let us have a new law—still keeping three states—the material, the theological, the positive. By all means, provided we do not suppose that the new formula is *contradictory* to the old. Comte's law dealt with the course of a transition and the order of its phases, and is not affected by the existence of other phases either before or after that course is run,

As a matter of fact, Comte was perfectly aware that there was a time when men were incapable of forming any general conceptions. Certain phenomena of great regularity impressed themselves on the human mind in this period, and were thus accepted before Man's imagination sought explanations in fictitious wills. Hence, there is no trace of a God of Weight. It may be added that in speaking of Theological, Metaphysical and Positive Ages, M. Worms uses a convenient designation for periods when each form of reasoning was especially prevalent. Comte's Law was that each *conception* passed through the three stages, or more accurately, that having once entered on the course, it pursues it to the end: but this implies that in every age, till all conceptions had completed that course, there would be some in one stage, some in another. To speak, *e.g.*, of a metaphysical age, is only a convenient way of saying that in such an age, metaphysical reasoning was especially common. In every historic period, since the sciences advance with unequal speed, we find all three methods co-existing. It must be added that M. Worms hardly shows the same justice to Leplay and his followers as he does to Comte and Spencer. This is easily understood if he considers the school of Leplay by itself; for to the organizing mind of our author, its work must seem very inadequate to cover the whole ground or constitute the science in its integrity. But to sociology, as instituted by Comte, the school of Leplay opens a new and fertile province, full of hope for the future.

With all his readiness to accept new light and to avoid old prejudices, M. Worms occasionally reproduces some old errors of respectable antecedents. The theory (p. 25) that like and unlike are attracted to each other, or at least that complementary characteristics are sought in marriage, has so far as physical qualities are concerned, been exploded by statistics. Is there any reason to suppose that it holds good for mental or moral qualities? Is not the perpetual struggle of the sexes (p. 266) largely imaginary? The Matriarchate was not the government of women—the eldest male of the family ruled—but the tracing of descent and family connection through female lines. Again, is not the present tendency of rural life towards a survival of peasant cultivation rather than, as M. Worms suggests (p. 122), towards cultivation on a large scale. Above all, and this is a very ancient view of history, which I had thought exploded long ago, can the Middle Ages be considered as a period of retrogression, so that there has been, not a continuous progress of Western civilization, but a rise in the Ancient World, a decline in the Middle Ages, and a rise again at the time of the Renaissance? No doubt the destruction due to the barbarians and the incorporation of the barbarians diverted much energy from its former channels. No doubt the ninth century was less intellectual than the first. But hitherto mankind has not progressed at equal pace along each line of advance. A civilization must be considered as a whole and not judged by the failure or success of a single element. Moreover, its capacity for growth must be taken into account as well as its immediate achievement; it must be judged dynamically as well as statically; every society has a future as well as a present. In the ancient world, union rested on force, the mass of the people were slaves, and long before Christianity triumphed or the barbarians poured in, Greek science had passed its meridian and was falling more and more into atrophy. The age of the great discoveries in mathematics and astronomy was past. During the Middle Ages, slavery had been transformed into serfdom, and at the end in the more civilized countries of the West, the serf was becoming free. To the imperial sway of Rome had succeeded the great spiritual union of the Church, and the rise of independent nationalities, each bringing its special contributions to the common heritage of mankind. And out of the centuries of seeming darkness, arose in all its amazing vitality the inexhaustible power of modern science. Compare ancient and modern science, and judge if the world had not gained some new elements of strength in the centuries between.

From the sociological point of view, one of the least satisfactory chapters is that on "Religion"; for therein he finds it difficult to reconcile fundamental characteristics with present tendencies. Religion, as he insists, is fundamentally social. It "is a collective phenomenon, and it is especially under this aspect that it enters into sociological studies." Yet we are told that this collective product tends to become individualized. "For the most exalted spirits (*les esprits les plus élevés*) religion is an entirely personal intercourse with the divine." Is this true even of the present age? It is an essentially Protestant view, and Protestantism does not seem to grow in strength. It can hardly be postulated of the greatest churchmen. Where are those people of greater minds than Pope Leo XIII, or Newman or Manning among the orthodox, or than Auguste Comte among the followers of newer lights, and yet all of these upheld a social view of religion. I think the source of the error becomes clear when M. Worms enumerating as the elements of religion, dogmas or creed, worship, institutions and moral teaching, of which the three first alone, in his view, are essential, quite unnecessarily defines the dogmas as "metaphysical principles concerning God or the gods." But he has already spoken of religion as a social product. Surely, then its dogmas will depend on the corresponding state of society and will only be metaphysical in an age when metaphysical reasoning is prevalent. In fact, as he points out later (p. 175), the social character of religion appears strongly in the frequent identification of God with a nation or society, a collective projection which may be understood when we remember that "the life of the individual is only possible thanks to the help of the entire group." The Highest is then identified with the continuous life of the group. Why as the conception of the group is enlarged, should this process be reversed, and religion become, not more social, but more individual?

But whatever may be the effect of the extension of solidarity on religion, M. Worms has no doubt that it is fundamental in morality. Every moral question in his view is a question of human relationship. The individual lives in a social environment:

"For, as regards society, the environment is the physical and organic world in which it is situated and lives. As regards the individual, the environment comprises at once this physical and organic world and society itself."

In other words, Man lives in a social environment, which affects him at every moment of his existence, imposes conditions on his thought and his activity, and is the source of his duties and his hopes.

S. H. SWINNY.

THE NEW CALENDAR OF GREAT MEN. Edited by Frederick Harrison, S. H. Swinny, and F. S. Marvin. London: Macmillan and Co., 1920. pp. xx + 708.

The Calendar of Great Men was originally published almost a generation ago by a group of English Positivists of whom Mr. Frederic Harrison is almost the only survivor. The new edition has been revised and many of the earlier articles have been entirely re-written by the present editors but the bulk of the book is the work of the original authors—Dr. Bridges, Professor Beesly, Mr. Frederick Harrison, Mr. Vernon Lushington, and one or two others.

Taking as a foundation the "Positivist Calendar," which Comte issued in 1849 and enlarged in the following year, the authors have endeavoured to give a concrete picture of the general course of civilization in a series of short biographical articles. As the 559 names in Comte's list were drawn from every age and every department of human activity and range from Abraham to Fenimore Cooper, and from Prometheus to Sir Charles Wheatstone, the present work represents no small amount of labour, and the editors are to be congratulated on the way in which they preserved a unity of design in dealing with this enormous mass of detail.

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It is this which gives the book its unique character. It is not a mere biographical dictionary. It differs from the encyclopædic type of work by a conscientious effort to go behind the externals of biographical detail, and to estimate the work of individuals as agents or types of the social and intellectual movements that have produced the modern world.

At the same time one cannot help regretting the decision of the editors to adhere rigidly to the original form of Comte's Calendar. The latter, in spite of its provisional character, was intended as an introduction to the concrete worship of Humanity. It formed part of the elaborate edifice of Positivist cultus which Comte constructed in all its detail, and it looked forward to the great ceremony of inauguration, when the relics of the noble dead from all parts of the world should be solemnly transferred to the Holy City—Paris—in the presence of the founder of the Religion of Humanity, and of the representatives of all the nations of the West.

Consequently the strictly historical treatment of the 559 names in Comte's list had to be subordinated to the requirements of the liturgical year. Each of the 13 months was devoted to a particular phase of social development, and placed under the patronage of a leading name, while each of the four weeks of the month represented a particular mode of the phase to which they belong. These two series formed the permanent framework of the Calendar, and were intended to be taken over into the normal system of Positivist worship. The remaining names—the daily types—were provisional in view of the moral needs of the transitional period before the abstract worship of Humanity, with its 81 annual festivals, could be inaugurated. The disadvantages of this system are obvious. It is necessary to range all the great names of universal history under 13 main types, without much regard to chronological order or to historical suitability. Thus Dante, the presiding genius of Modern Epic Poetry, heads a list which includes the Renaissance painters, Mme. de Stael, and St. Francis de Sales. Under St. Paul came the Emperor Marcan, Heloise and the Mediæval Architects, while Frederic of Prussia presides with grim appropriateness over the Modern Statesmen from Cosimo de Medici down to Francia, the dictator of Paraguay.

Worst of all, for the purposes of the present volume, is the month of Theocracy, for it sets the writers an almost impossible task. No one can deal satisfactorily in two-score pages with such an *omnium gatherum* as this, where Buddha and Ossian, St. John the Baptist and Harun el Rashid, Kamehama and the Theocrats of Thibet jostle one another breathlessly.

It is true, as the editors say, that the list was conceived by Comte as a carefully balanced whole, yet for the purposes of a biographical manual to illustrate the general course of civilization, a purely historical arrangement offers undeniable advantages.

There are also strong arguments for some modification and amendment of the list of names. When one considers that the original Calendar was published more than seventy years ago, one is astonished at the historical sense and the breadth of view shown by the compiler. Comte's appreciation of the Middle Ages did not blind him, as it did so many of his contemporaries—to the achievements of the Renaissance, and he could do justice at once to the Spain of Philip II and to the France of Louis XV. Comte inherited the French Catholic-Conservative cultural tradition, he was in the line of Bossuet and de Bonald, yet he was at the same time remarkably free from national bias, and capable of appreciating fully the achievements of Protestant and individualist England.

Nevertheless time must inevitably find weak spots in any universal survey such as this. We can no longer promise immortality to the author of the Scalp Hunters, or to Elisa Mercœur. The inclusion of Bellini and Donizetti is hardly less hard for us

to understand than the exclusion of J. S. Bach. Cuvier and Humboldt and Laplace are missing, as well as Plotinus and Scotus Erigena, and Maimonides. The Byzantines have no representatives save Marcan and Pulcheria, not even Justinian. Ireland finds no place in the month of Catholicism, though the Irish monks, such as Columbanus were no less important than the Benedictines in the dawn of the mediæval world. The neglect of the East is intentional, yet one feels the lack of great names like Asoka and Akbar.

Moreover, the dawn of history, which Comte illustrated by mythical figures, now possesses real heroes, such as Hammurabi and Akten-aten, who might well replace Belus and Semiramis. Above all, the month of Modern Science requires completion by the great names that have arisen since 1840, during the greatest age of scientific progress that the world has ever known. Finally, the book would gain completeness by a notice of Comte himself, since the whole arrangement of the work is so intimately bound up with this thought and his personality. A list of this kind is really well adapted to a gradual process of enlargement and amelioration. The Calendar of 1849, admirable as a foundation, still stands in need of the changes that are brought by years of criticism and improvement.

The biographical articles themselves are for the most part models of accuracy and clarity. The earlier chapters have been largely re-written in view of the progress of history and archaeology during the last 30 years. It is unfortunate that this has not also been done in the case of the articles that deal with the rise of Christianity, and which are still based on the theories of the Tübingen School. The conclusions of Baur were generally abandoned long before 1890, and to-day they would find no critic to support them.

These, however, are exceptions. Undoubtedly the most valuable part of the work is the series of biographies of the men of science of the 17th and 18th centuries, a parallel to which it would be difficult to find elsewhere.

These articles, brief yet not arid, form a complete survey of the rise of modern science, a fascinating story too little known to most of us. The section that deals with the science of the ancient world is hardly less interesting. We hope that in its new form the Calendar will be even more widely known and appreciated than it has been hitherto.

CHRISTOPHER DAWSON.

THE ORIGINS OF MAN AND OF HIS SUPERSTITIONS. By Prof. Carveth Read.

"The Origin of Man and of His Superstitions" will probably be regarded as the best of Prof. Read's works. Clear in arrangement, excellent in style, and with a flavour of it peculiar to himself, cautious and sound in judgment, his book shows no partiality for his own theories and, by maintaining the scientific spirit throughout, wins the reader's confidence. Coming after the powerful essay of Mr. Trotter on "Instincts of the Herd," he has made important corrections and additions to it. Mr. Trotter, while realizing the profound influence of gregariousness on human development, conceived it as a "herd" instinct; which in its proper sense belongs only to defensive animals not given to attack, least of all to attacks in organized groups for securing prey. Nor are animals that possess a herd-instinct carnivorous; but man is everywhere partly carnivorous. Prof. Read therefore substitutes for the conception of the herd-instinct the conception of life in the hunting pack. Mr. Trotter means to include the pack-instinct in the former; but he does not appear to realize the important consequences that follow from their distinction.

The original hypothesis of Prof. Read is that the differences between man and "his nearest relatives" may all be traced to the influence of one variation operating among the original anthropoid conditions "... the adoption of the flesh diet and the

habits of a hunter in order to obtain it" (p. 1). This hunting life was probably co-operative; for man is everywhere "both social and co-operative," and "a few thousand years ago there was no co-operation except hunting and war" (p. 8). The pack-instinct is chiefly familiar to us as the characteristic instinct of wolves and wild dogs,—that variety of the hunting-instinct which pursues and kills prey not solitarily but through social co-operation.

Prof. Read argues that assuming man to be descended from the anthropoid stock, which is chiefly frugivorous, the change to a flesh diet which made him adopt the life of a hunter, and to organize into groups for the pursuit of prey, must have occurred sometime, since man "is everywhere more or less carnivorous; the earliest known men were hunters; weapons are among the earliest known artefacts" (p. 2); and to this day "most of the amusements as well as the occupations of mankind depend for their zest upon the spirit of hunting and fighting . . ." (p. 9). This is a forcible argument; but it has a curious consequence—that on the peaceful, domestic anthropoid must have been grafted the character of a wolf or wild dog. Hence the conclusion of our author that man became "a sort of wolf-ape" (p. 35). . . . For man, he thinks, "is in character more like a dog or a wolf than he is like any other animal" (p. 8). Thus it is that "man understands the thoughts of the dog" and the dog "the thoughts of the man," as Galton remarked (p. 40).

It will be generally admitted that this conclusion, if true, has profound psychological significance; but it will probably be long before the psychological implications are fully understood. If the new work we do and the new life that we come to lead in adaptation to our environment are the chief cause of a change of character, as may perhaps be inferred from the well-known doctrine of the Leplay school, how much must the character of primitive man have changed when he organized himself into hunting packs for the securing of animal food. Yet Prof. Read does not appear to think that this change was in the first instance brought about by a new instinct. "The whole art of hunting," he writes, "had to be learned from its rudiments" (pp. 46-47). The primitive mind "depending for its skill not upon instinct or imitation, but upon observation and memory and inference, it was necessary for it to arrange ideas in a definite order before acting on them, as in making weapons or planning a hunt; indefiniteness or confusion in such matters was fatal" (p. 48). The motive that led to the new development was probably hunger or at least a "stronger appetite for food than the gorilla" (p. 39). The motive was a strong one,—the kind of 'necessity' which is 'the mother of invention'; but great difficulties involving prolonged delays faced it. These of the stock that showed superiority for organization would have a better chance of survival; and their gifts would tend to be transmitted. Sooner or later the capacity for organization would be inherited even if it never became a true instinct common to the race. For we find in our own day two types strongly contrasted: the old English individualism with its independence, its love of freedom, its desire to do things in its own way by 'trial and error,' its initiative; and the type which modern, industrial organization is more and more imposing on human nature, the sacrifice of independence and of individuality, the standardization of methods and types, the fitting men to tasks of routine that take away the joy of work, imitation in place of initiative, while only in the higher kinds of work is there call for individuality of thought and method.

Prof. Read makes a valiant attempt to grapple with the psychological implications of the change from the free, independent and peaceful family life of the anthropoids to the warlike life of the hunting pack; and it is here that his work is superior to that of Mr. Trotter. Mr. Trotter values modern psychology; but his own is almost summed up in the recognition of instincts: in man, the instincts of "self-preservation, nutrition, sex and the herd." Hence he is obliged to attribute to instinct what does

not belong to it but belongs to those higher growths of the mind which, starting from the instincts, have absorbed and largely transformed their nature, supplementing and often controlling them by their higher or more recently developed ends. Thus he attributes to the gregarious instinct not merely the 'suggestibility' of man, but also his morality and religion. "Conscience," he tells us, "is an indirect result of the gregarious instinct, and is in no sense derived from a special instinct forcing man to consider the good of the race rather than individual desires" ("Instincts of the Herd," p. 41). But may not conscience be derived from the family life? "The child, he writes, receives from the herd the doctrines . . . that truthfulness is the most valuable of all the virtues that honesty is the best policy, that to the religious man death has no terrors. . . ." (*op. cit.*, p. 49). Whence then does the herd derive these doctrines? Does it derive them from another herd, or from some individual of the herd, and what psychology of the herd or of the individual will account for them? Is it still the gregarious instinct?

If the fierce life of the chase has been superposed on the peaceful family life of the anthropoids, how many other developments of which we know nothing may have occurred since? But there are some of which we can give an account. What is this 'reason,' forming beliefs on rational evidence, which Mr. Trotter contrasts so powerfully with the non-rational beliefs due to 'herd-suggestion'? It is not "derived from a new instinct," he thinks. But it is part of a new sentiment for Truth; and this new sentiment creates a new end. This is not biological like the ends of instincts, it is an end that values truth for truth's sake.

It is one of these new sentiments that Prof. Read recognizes as arising from the new life in the hunting-pack imposed on primitive man: the love of the chase. This is a 'social' sentiment in the fullest sense, because (1) each member of the pack knows that others share it, and (2) because it is largely due to their co-operation. "The master-interest of every member of the pack lies in the chase, because success in it is necessary to life" ("The Origin of Man," p. 41). This is the beginning, and the term 'interest' connotes it better than 'sentiment'; for at first the chase is only pursued as a means to the satisfaction of hunger. But it develops into a 'sentiment' when the means become also an end. Men become adapted to the new mode of life and enjoys it, and the chase is loved for itself. And in this way many of our leading sentiments are known to be formed: as avarice and the love of knowledge. The complex disposition to the love of the chase is strong and innate in many individuals to this day, and the successful hunter, says Sellous, "becomes a primeval savage, remorseless, triumphant, full of wild exulting joy, which none but those who have lived in the wilderness, and depended on their success as hunters for their daily food, can ever know or comprehend" (*op. cit.*, p. 41).

We have not space to enter upon a detailed account of the qualities of character which this master-sentiment of the chase tends to develop; but certain of the emotions that belong to the system may be noticed. There is the triumphant joy in the attainment of the end—the killing of the prey—after difficulties, delays and dangers; "often gratified (as with birds of prey) without regard to their needs" (p. 41). Anger and fear will belong to the system; being frequently evoked; as when the prey resists, or seems to be overcoming the hunter. There must be cruelty in a sense: the inhibition of sympathy with the victim. On the other hand, there will be sympathy between the members of the pack toward one another; to those, as the Englishman says who are 'good sportsmen.'

Prof. Read distinguishes three varieties of this sympathy: (1) perceptive sympathy, (2) contagious sympathy, (3) effective sympathy (pp. 42-43); all united "to defend any associate against aggression from outside the pack." In another interesting passage, Prof. Read seems to distinguish a fourth variety, "emotional sympathy" (p. 63).

For you may have "perceptive" sympathy with a man's feelings where you disapprove of his conduct; "but there is no emotional sympathy or participation in them" (p. 63). This is perhaps due to difference in the degree and completeness of the sympathy. For in the worst kinds of cruelty, as Prof. Read recognizes, there must be some degree of sympathy in order to understand and enjoy the suffering to be inflicted.

An essential feature of the pack is some inequality of relationship between its members. There will be the instincts of self-assertion and self-abasement, with "fighting until each knows his place, followed by complete submission on the part of the inferior" (p. 44). Thus will arise "gradation of authority" (p. 45), and subordination of all to the leader, and this subordination, induced probably by fear, will sometimes grow into a genuine respect for superiors in which fear is only an ingredient.

In the latter part of his book, Prof. Read deals with the superstitions of primitive man, enquiring how it came to pass that animism, totemism, magic, omens and taboos, did not arrest human development, after it had made such a great advance by co-operation, by language, by the discovery how to make fire and many other inventions. The answer he finds is that these things have helped to maintain social subordination by giving power to elders, chiefs and kings. "I conceive," he says, "that after the organization of the primitive hunting-pack had, by various causes, been weakened or destroyed, it was through belief in magic that some sort of leadership and subordination were re-established" (p. 253). These superstitions, though in an attenuated form, are strangely persistent even in modern civilization, and if they decline in one age, reassert themselves in another. Scientific minds that ridicule them are sometimes guided by them. They are no doubt influenced by our desires and hopes and fears. But if we define them as "imagination-beliefs" which "cannot be verified" (p. 72), then, however foolish most of them may be, so that we are glad to be rid of them, there are others, included in the definition, without which the human mind would be poor indeed, being very near its best hopes, and implied in its trusts, and in the courage which sustains them, and in fact in everything which it holds most dear.

In taking our leave of Prof. Read's book, after having touched inadequately on some of the many interesting problems contained in it, the general impression left on us is of a book written with the most conscientious care, in which every sentence has been carefully weighed, where there are no exaggerations, no impulsive utterances or specious theories, but self-controlled throughout by its breadth of knowledge and sound common-sense. If by its very weightiness and deliberation it does not give us the surprising first impression of such books as Dr. McDougall's and Mr. Trotter's, it has these compensating advantages.

ALEXANDER F. SHAND.

THE GROUP MIND.

THE GROUP MIND: A sketch of the Principles of Collective Psychology, with some attempt to apply them to the Interpretation of National Life and Character. By William McDougall. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

In *The Group Mind* Professor McDougall has continued the work whose foundations he laid down in his notable little Introduction to *Social Psychology*. His later book is written with the same broad scholarship, and equable temper that one has learned to expect in Professor McDougall's work, and in the more controversial parts of the subject these distinctions, and especially the last, should not pass without note. Essentially because Professor McDougall has not hesitated to be a pioneer in blazing the way for the application of psychology to complex social phenomena, a great part of his work is still of a somewhat tentative nature, and at the beginning it is necessary

to examine the premises upon which he has developed his social psychology before passing judgment upon the results that have been embodied in the present book.

"The task of Group Psychology," Dr. McDougall says, "are . . . to examine the conception of the collective or group mind, in order to determine whether and in what sense this is a valid conception; to display the general principles of collective mental life which are incapable of being deduced from the laws of the mental life of isolated individuals; to distinguish the principal types of collective mental life or group mind; to describe the peculiarities of those types and as far as possible to account for them." Professor McDougall's treatment of the group mind rests upon these foundations. To explore the implication of these statements is almost to explore his book.

The first question that this statement excites is whether the task of a science is to "examine a conception" or whether it is to examine a certain set of facts. If it is to examine a set of facts where are the materials from which Professor McDougall had drawn his references? Has there been any detailed observation of the behaviour of men in groups? Has anyone published a report beginning with an observation of the behaviour of two or three people when they meet casually, noting the modifications that take place in their adjustments, and proceeding from this simple social reaction to more numerous groups whose behaviour patterns are conditioned by much more specific purposes, and within more definite physical limits. The answer to these questions is, as far as I am aware, No. The materials upon which the greater number of the studies of "collective psychology," the "crowd" and the "group mind" have been based are drawn from the scattered observations and readings of the particular scholar who has essayed the subject. Whilst the terminology has become more precise, and the conceptions of psychology, drawn from genuine observation and experiment, have become more numerous, the method that is still employed in social psychology is no different from that used by Hobbes in *The Leviathan*. I shall revert to this point at a later stage.

In the next sentence quoted Professor McDougall speaks of "general principles of collective mental life which are incapable of being deduced from the laws of the mental life of isolated individuals." Here Professor McDougall derives one abstraction from the partial failure of another abstraction. Where outside the mind of an introspective philosopher, who has forgotten for the moment that he is walking within the quadrangle of his college, does an "isolated individual" exist? Isolated individuals have no mental life: the very consciousness of individuality is a product of the social process. The psychology of men in groups—in a theatre, a workshop, or a regimental drill ground—is of a different pattern, doubtless, than the psychology of a person who is selecting colours under the observation of an investigator in a laboratory: but both situations are social situations, and although the immediate social content may approach zero the relevant social background is very important indeed. This fact has been pointed out by American anthropologists in connection with the intelligence tests devised for the American army on the Benet-Stanford system: the evidence would seem to show that it is impossible to test for raw "native ability," since "native ability" is a formal abstraction and cannot altogether be separated from cultural acquisitions which the "individual" has made as the member of one or another social group. Just as the physiology of an "individual" cannot be studied without reference to his physical environment—the intake of air, water, minerals, and organic nutriment—so the psychology of an individual cannot be completely investigated without reference to his social environment. In this sense, all psychology is social psychology, at least in the human species. Hence when Professor McDougall goes on to urge the necessity for distinguishing between the principal types of collective mental life or group mind he is really calling attention to the necessity for examining the specific social institutions—and social situations—in which each "individual" functions from

the date of his birth. Unfortunately, Professor McDougall apparently does not see the need for anything so concrete as this; it is the weakness of his "conception of the group mind" that it attempts to describe the behaviour of men in groups without reference to the specific environment—the definite place or building—in which they operate. It is true that in discussing the conditions favourable to the development of a group mind in that amorphous sociological anomaly called the "nation" Professor McDougall points out the advantage of definite boundaries: he does not, however, see the overwhelming importance of this in every social situation. The difference between the "irrational" reactions of a man in a mob in Trafalgar Square and his considerate behaviour as he sits in his home in Stepney is largely due to the fact that in Trafalgar Square he is surrounded by other men, he cannot make any definite physical movements, the amount of carbon dioxide he inhales is increased, the capacity for conversation is limited (since a thousand people cannot make speeches or carry on a conversation) to grunts and brief noises—and so forth. The psychologist must recognize human beings are not "minds" living in vacuum jars, nor even "specimens" going through their paces in the laboratory. They are primarily living organisms, reacting through their ability to seize energy and utilize their social heritage, upon a complicated environment.

Professor McDougall is perhaps more than half-way to a recognition of this fact: but if his objective is that of the sociologist his method, alas! is largely that of the speculative philosopher. This weakness in method vitiates his entire treatment of the subject, and if one had space in the present review to examine the whole book it would only be to point out one dubious metaphysical distinction—such as the Rousseauian "general will" and the will of all—after another. At bottom this weakness derives from Professor McDougall's desire to bolster up and substantiate the national state, and in particular that apotheosis of the national state which has been developed in English-speaking countries. Professor McDougall, to tell the truth, is not nearly so much interested in the Group Mind as he is in the "National Mind." He is willing to let the Group Mind remain a ghost if he can only prove that the National Mind is a reality. Hence only about a hundred pages out of three hundred are devoted to an analysis of the simpler manifestations of the Group Mind: the rest is taken up with a discussion of What is a Nation? National Character, the Will of the Nation, Nations of the Higher Type, Factors of National Development, etc. The best that one can say of two-thirds of Professor McDougall's book is that it is apologetics of great erudition, and that, perhaps, it does credit to an earnest, patriotic heart. To say it does not deserve the name of science is only to say that it falls within an entirely different tradition. Viewed from the standpoint of psycho analysis Professor McDougall's development of the group mind is an elaborate rationalization of a simple patriotism complex. The essentially mythic character of the work is disguised by a scientific terminology: less literate and scholarly minds achieve the same sort of satisfaction, from similar praiseworthy motives, by writing editorials for *John Bull*. It is with no disrespect to that fine part of Professor McDougall's work—especially the Introduction to Social Psychology—which is genuinely scientific that one is inclined to say that the cruder ways of manifesting patriotism are on the whole less dangerous, because everyone can immediately recognize them for what they are worth.

LEWIS MUMFORD.

THE SPRINGFIELD SURVEY.

To the Russell Sage Foundation, that typically American institution, we are indebted for a series of reports and publications dealing with the survey of cities, the planning of exhibits for the purpose of bringing home to the public the results of these surveys, and the organization of publicity campaigns, including travelling exhibits and

railway trains fitted up as propaganda centres to move from place to place. Of especial value are the reports known as the Springfield Survey, a study of the social conditions in a typical American city of moderate size. The survey has been issued in three volumes which cover reports on nine principal fields of investigation. Volume 3, the one now presented, summarizes the results of the surveys and the conclusions which arise from them. The whole series of publications forms a most valuable contribution to the study of social conditions in modern city life, and towards the diagnosis of the ills from which the civic body suffers.

In many places in these publications we find this analogy drawn between a civic survey and a medical consultation. The civic body is not functioning properly. The Russell Sage Foundation is thereupon called in and proceeds to a thorough examination into the city's condition. But to gather facts and to correlate them, important as this may be, is not enough. The survey is "diagnosis to the end that a prescription may be written." All these publications deal with these two aspects of civic survey: diagnosis and prescription; civic survey proper, or the getting and interpretation of the facts; and publicity, or as the Americans put it, "getting your message across." A survey, to quote the excellent definition given, is "an implement for more intelligent democracy, its chief features or characteristics being: the careful investigation, analysis and interpretation of the facts, and the acquainting and education of the community not only to conditions found but to the corrective and preventive measures to be adopted. The survey, moreover, lays emphasis upon the importance of studying problems in their various community-wide relations and urges co-operative action on a community-wide basis. It deals with the whole district and endeavours to lead individuals to think in terms of the whole."

In the Springfield survey we have a good example of how the work may be carried out. Springfield is a city in the State of Illinois having a population of about 58,000 people. It is situated in the heart of a rich agricultural region, and is the centre of important mining, manufacturing and trade enterprises. The manufactures include watchmaking, shoes, electric supplies, agricultural implements, asphalt paving, and zinc. It is, we are told, "not a city of many extremes but a city of many averages." The city has grown without the guidance of a city plan. The population is fairly evenly distributed. Single family houses are the rule, and most families enjoy a yard. At the time of the survey—in the spring and summer of 1914—multiple dwellings had just begun to appear, but tenements were not yet numerous. It was then gaining ground as a factory city. A previous survey of Springfield had been carried out by the City's Health Officer by means of a house-to-house canvas, and a map had been prepared showing the conditions found. As a result of this survey various ordinances were passed setting a higher standard for the regulation of sanitary and housing conditions. The survey in 1914 was carried through by the Department of Surveys and Exhibits of the Russell Sage Foundation, with the assistance of six other departments of the Foundation, five national organizations, five Illinois State organizations, the social agencies of Springfield and 600 voluntary workers. Nine lines of enquiries were followed, viz. :—

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Through lack of funds it was unable to deal with city planning, taxation, and religious organizations, although these were touched upon in some of the other enquiries. The total cost of the survey was 25,000 dollars.

Turning over the pages of the volume which summarizes the results of the survey many interesting points arrest our attention. We begin to be interested in that population of 58,000 people with its 6 per cent. of negro population. We find that it is set in a county which has a population in addition of 40,000, so that we have in the whole region 98,000 people of whom 40,000 are rural and 58,000 occupy the urbanized nucleus. We are interested to find that of this population 20 per cent. are engaged in attending school, that 43 per cent. are occupied in what are called "gainful occupations," earning their livings in one way or another.

One would like to pursue further the economic basis of this town, to ascertain how the remaining 37 per cent. are occupied: a large proportion of these no doubt would lie between the school age and the period when gainful work begins: they would include the infants under school age, house-wives and the people of leisure and independent means. It is interesting to note that even in so small a city about 10 per cent. of those engaged in gainful occupations minister to the transport needs of the community—on the railways, tramways and haulage of various kinds. How little we really know about the modern city! Whether, for example, those engaged in transport of all kinds would increase proportionately to the population as the city grew; or whether in a large city the proportion would be much larger, following the well-known general rule that the number of journeys per head of population on public means of transport tends to increase faster even than the square of the increase of population; or whether on the contrary there are compensating economies in labour due to the large scale distribution of goods and passengers which to a greater extent prevails in the more populous centres. Yet it is of the utmost importance that those who have to guide the growth of the city should know these facts; should know what are the limits of efficiency in all the different aspects of city life. It is clear that the larger the city the greater will be the opportunities for successful individual merchants and shopkeepers to make fortunes for themselves. It is by no means equally clear that there is not a point in the growth of a city beyond which every increase puts a greater burden of labour and cost upon the average individual without conferring upon him any compensating advantage either in gainful opportunities or in the more valuable opportunities of social life and culture. The Russell Sage Foundation in undertaking this and other sample surveys is doing pioneer work of the utmost value. The need for such a survey has already commended itself to the enlightened city of Sheffield in this country; the example must rapidly be followed, one would suppose, by the authorities responsible for every growing community who wish to found their policy in dealing with the many activities connected with city government upon something more than mere tradition or intelligent guesswork.

The survey itself does not, however, conclude the enquiry. It is recognized by the promoters that the survey is only valuable as it is made use of: that it must be intelligently interpreted, and the interpretation must then be put before the people of the city in such a manner that they can fully realize its import and see the value of the conclusions which have been drawn from it. For this reason in the case of the Springfield Survey, the reports were summarized in the local press, a complete statement of findings was published, and an exhibition setting forth these findings in an arresting manner was held. We are made to realize in the publications of the Russell Sage Foundation, with their wealth of illustration, to what a fine art publicity is carried in America.

The result of the Springfield Survey was a great stimulus to community education and awakening; it led, moreover, to many practical reforms in education, housing,

treatment of the mentally defective delinquents, etc. "American experience," says one writer, "is piling up the conviction that communities will act upon facts when they have them."

RAYMOND UNWIN.

PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF SOCIAL WORK AT NEW ORLEANS, 1920. (University of Chicago Press.)

Students and social workers in this country are familiar with most of the problems which were discussed at New Orleans last year—problems of mental, moral and physical well-being, of human relationships and human behaviour, or of organization—but they will find much that is very suggestive in their treatment in the papers which comprise this report. Differences in social conditions and in the language in which they are discussed do not alone account for this: there is revealed a difference of outlook and of emphasis.

In particular it is clear that the conception of "community" and of community life has far greater influence on thought in America than in these Islands. One problem after another is discussed as a "community problem"; the community is recognized as being responsible for it and therefore for its solution. This being so the first and chief need is seen to be a thorough understanding of the community itself, and no doubt this accounts for the fact that the value of surveys is more widely appreciated in America. "If normal family life is dependant on a proper standard of living and on the proper relationship of the individual members of the family to one another, so must a normal community-life take into consideration the social, physical and economical advantages, and the relationship of all individuals of the community to one another."

It follows, naturally enough, that leaders of social service in America are paying increasing attention to the study of processes. "Life," says Jung, in *Analytical Psychology*, "is not made up of yesterdays only, nor is it understood and explained by reducing to-day to yesterday. Life has also a to-morrow, and to-day is only understood if we are able to add the indication of to-morrow to our knowledge of what was yesterday." Appreciation of this truth is shown not only in the surveys referred to, but also in the use of psychological knowledge in the treatment of both individuals and groups. The papers dealing with various aspects of the problem of delinquency are particularly suggestive on the one hand, and on the other it is interesting to see how great an importance is attached to recreation and the right use of leisure as affecting individual and community life.

The emphasis placed on organization as an instrument of social progress is also noteworthy. Local federations or councils of social agencies, somewhat similar to the representative councils of social service which are multiplying in this country, appear to be recognized in America as essential to real progress. It may be that acceptance of the "community ideal" also accounts for this fact, or it may be that Americans are naturally more ready to embark on co-operative action. At all events, a certain largeness of view, an impression of foresight and of constructive planning, characterizes the papers in this interesting volume.

L. F. E.

THE CENSUS AND SOME OF ITS USES: Outlining a Plain Philosophy of Population. George T. Bisset-Smith. pp. 228. W. Green and Son, Ltd., Edinburgh, 1921.

In this volume Mr. Bisset-Smith gives a clear and systematic account of the Census of the British Isles, dealing both with the history of census taking, and with the Census of 1921. The resulting population statistics are examined and discussed, and the ideas lying behind the enquiries in the Census Schedules are carefully explained. The book forms a very convenient manual of the subject which will, no doubt, be extensively used in the immediate future by all interested.

CURRENT PERIODICALS.

The conclusion and summary of a thesis on Totemism for which its author, M. Van Gennep obtained the title of Doctor of Letters at the Sorbonne in February last, appears in the *Revue Internationale de Sociologie*, for March-April, under the title of "*L'état actuel de problème totémique*." An outstanding and valuable feature of it is the chronological table of the various investigations that have been made of totemism, adding in each case the keyword description of the theory adopted. M. Van Gennep, while recognizing the highly complex nature of the phenomenon, ranks himself among the investigators who single out an element from the whole and regard it as the germ or essential kernel round which other elements more superficial have gathered, rather than among those who are of opinion that the diverse elements have coalesced without priority or superiority. M. Van Gennep selects as universal and essential:—

- (1) the idea and feeling of kindred between a human group and a species of animal or plant—the savage explanation of such an idea or feeling being in his opinion secondary;
- (2) the localization *within a definite territory* of both the human group and the species with which there is considered to be kinship.

This hypothesis takes as a point of departure the fundamental necessities of social life, viz., the cohesion of the group and its continuity; the social unit must obviously include not merely the human members, but also certain natural objects on which their existence depends, among which plants and animals take a foremost place, while the determining scene of all their activities is the territory which they inevitably regard as their possession.

The various magical ceremonies associated with totemism, whether of multiplication of the totem object, or of ancestor-worship, or of initiation, or the countless beliefs and taboos relating to birth, death or marriage, M. Van Gennep maintains to be subsidiary only to the territorial idea and to the fundamental cohesion and continuity. The Central Australian myth of the wandering Alcheringa who enter the ground at death, and thereupon haunt certain localities as unborn children ready to pounce upon their future mothers, illustrates this connection of fantasy and reality.

His view of exogamy is that stress is rather to be laid on the positive injunction to marry, rather than on the negative prohibition of incest. It is permissible perhaps to ask whether here we have not rather a psychological than a sociological driving force, whether a social injunction of marriage is really a necessary premiss, and whether the Freudian school may not here be right in regarding exogamy as a trace of the primitive conflict between the older and younger males of a group for the possession of the younger females, ending in the search outside the group for the object of fantasy denied by reality. The idea and feeling of kindred, the pivot of M. Van Gennep's illuminating thesis, has undoubtedly a socializing and uniting force, but it is not, and surely never has been, without its darker side of suspicion, fear, and hatred. The long struggle of man that goes to the achievement of a true social life is exemplar enough of this.

Mme. Suzanne de Callias continues from the January number her travel notes of Central Europe. Her portrayal of the mentality of the Czech republic, its frank departure from tradition, its *bonhomie* and assimilation to French modes of thought and life is most vivid. Her point of view is perhaps rather that of the capital than of the country as a whole. A passing allusion only is made to the Sokol institutions.

The symposium on Palestine of the *Société de Sociologie de Paris* would appear to have turned rather on the political than on the sociological aspects of the situation.

PROCEEDINGS OF THE SOCIETY.

During the Summer Term the Society organized three joint meetings. The first of these was held in conjunction with the S.E. Union of Scientific Societies, and the Regional Association on Friday, the 22nd April, at the rooms of the Linnean Society, Burlington House, when Mr. George Morris gave a paper on the Saffron Walden Survey, illustrated by lantern slides. Professor Boulger kindly took the chair.

Joint meetings with the Regional Association were also held on Thursday, May 12th, and Thursday June 2nd. At the first of these Professor Patrick Geddes spoke on "Co-operation in Social Studies" (Chairman: Principal Ernest Barker), and at the second Professor Patrick Abercrombie read a paper on "Municipal Survey of Sheffield" (Professor Adshead in the chair).

The Society also organized a meeting on Tuesday, the 14th June, in the rooms of the Royal Society, at which the Hon. Mr. V. S. Srinivasa Sastri spoke on "The Non-Co-operation Movement in India" (Chairman: Mr. Edwyn Bevan).

Study Groups. The last meeting, before the summer holidays, of the group for the study of *La Science Sociale* was held on Wednesday, the 29th June. The first volume of M. Demolins' work, "*Comment la Route crée le Type social*" has now been translated by members of the Group, and the translation of the second volume has begun. The Group will resume its meetings for the autumn session on September 28th. Members and Associates of the Society wishing to join this Group should send in their names to the Secretary.

At the end of the Lent Term it became necessary for Miss M. E. Robinson to resign the Secretaryship of the Joint Social Psychology Group for family reasons. A resolution of thanks to Miss Robinson for her services was unanimously passed at the next meeting of the Group, and an Executive Committee was thereupon formed to organize research work and meetings. It has been decided by this Committee that the re-organized Group shall begin its work by a study of the Family. The subject has been divided into sections—The Primitive Family; Early Civilizations; The Classical Period; the Mediæval Period; the Modern Period, and members of the Group have been invited to undertake research work in any of these sections. Professor Westermarck has kindly given his assistance to the Committee, both in a consultative capacity, and also by delivering an inaugural address to the Group on "The Primitive Family," on May 11th. Members and Associates of the Society wishing to join this Group should send in their names to the Secretary. The Group is also open to non-members for a fee of 10/6 per annum.

Special Meetings. Professor Patrick Geddes delivered a very successful course of lectures on Civics and Sociology during May and the early part of June. The lectures which had been arranged in this connection for the latter part of June were postponed, and instead a course was arranged in conjunction with the Guild of Education, at 11, Tavistock Square, W.C.1, on "Education in its Wider Aspects and on its Various Levels," on July 12th, 14th, 19th and 21st, at 6 p.m.

BOOKS RECEIVED.

*THE RATIONAL GOOD. A Study in the Logic of Practice. L. T. Hobhouse. pp. 165. Allen and Unwin, London, 1921. 8/6d. net.

*OUR SOCIAL HERITAGE. Graham Wallas. pp. 292. Allen and Unwin, London, 1921. 12/6d. net.

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